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The Committee for Economic Development
is an independent research and policy organi-
zation of some 250 business leaders and edu-
cators. CED is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and non-
political. Its purpose is to propose policies that
bring about steady economic growth at high
employment and reasonably stable prices, in-
creased productivity and living standards,
greater and more equal opportunity for every
citizen, and an improved quality of life for all.
All CED policy recommendations must
have the approval of trustees on the Research
and Policy Committee. This committee is
directed under the bylaws, which emphasize
that “all research is to be thoroughly objective
in character, and the approach in each instance
is to be from the standpoint of the general
welfare and not from that of any special politi-
cal or economic group.” The committee is aided
by a Research Advisory Board of leading so-
cial scientists and by a small permanent pro-
fessional staff.
The Research and Policy Committee does
not attempt to pass judgment on any pending
specific legislative proposals; its purpose is to
urge careful consideration of the objectives set
forth in this statement and of the best means of
accomplishing those objectives.
Each statement is preceded by extensive
discussions, meetings, and exchange of memo-
randa. The research is undertaken by a sub-
committee, assisted by advisors chosen for their
competence in the field under study.
The full Research and Policy Committee
participates in the drafting of recommenda-
tions. Likewise, the trustees on the drafting
subcommittee vote to approve or disapprove
a policy statement, and they share with the
Research and Policy Committee the privilege
of submitting individual comments for publi-
cation.
Except for the members of the Research and
Policy Committee and the responsible subcommit-
tee, the recommendations presented herein are not
necessarily endorsed by other trustees or by the
advisors, contributors, staff members, or others
associated with CED.
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The United States needs a coherent and sus-
tained economic policy toward Asia. Economic
and political developments in Asia are having
an extensive and increasing impact on global
prospects for peace and prosperity as well as
on the economic future of American workers
and businesses.
A substantive policy contribution from the
private sector should be a critical element of
U.S. strategy. There has been little business-to-
business dialogue about trade and investment
issues in conjunction with the increasing promi-
nence of Asian economies. In spite of its day-to-
day involvement, business has been insuffi-
ciently involved in representing long-term U.S.
interests to policy makers.
This policy statement is a major component
in a multi-year CED Asia Initiative designed to
provide a voice for U.S. business in shaping
U.S. policy toward the Asia-Pacific region.
Another important goal of this project is to
connect U.S. business to a network of private
business organizations representing the current
and future economic powers of the Pacific Rim.
This is designed to expand CED’s nearly three
decades of experience in sharing ideas with a
global network of counterpart organizations.
These relationships with organizations in
Europe, Japan, and Australia have given CED
the opportunity to issue joint statements on
issues of common concern, to share research,
and to engage in international dialogue on the
U.S. role in the global economy.
To advance this goal, in October 1996, CED
conducted the first Pacific Leaders Forum
(organized in cooperation with the National
Center for APEC). Held in Seattle, this effort
attracted over 200 senior business leaders from
Australia, Canada, China and Hong Kong,
PURPOSE OF THIS STATEMENT
Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand,
The Philippines, Singapore, South Korea,
Taiwan, the United States, and Vietnam for a
discussion of critical trade and investment
issues.
LEGACY OF INTERNATIONAL
LEADERSHIP
For our own, the Pacific Region’s, and in-
deed the world’s security and prosperity, the
United States must expand, not limit, its role
in Asia. Although complete isolation would in
any case be impossible, trends that promote
restrictive economic arrangements are harm-
ful to the United States, Asia, and the world.
From its founding in 1942, CED has fo-
cused on stimulating international economic
activity as a means of fostering worldwide
economic growth and ensuring future stabil-
ity. Early CED statements provided needed
business support for such landmark initiatives
as the Marshall Plan and the Bretton Woods
Agreement.
In recent years, CED published the report
The United States in the New Global Economy:
A Rallier of Nations (1992). This statement —
marking CED’s 50th anniversary — was fol-
lowed by In Our Best Interest: NAFTA and the
New American Economy (1993), Prescription for
Progress: The Uruguay Round in the New Global
Economy (1994), and U.S. Trade Policy Beyond
the Uruguay Round (1994).
From Promise to Progress: Towards a New Stage
in U.S.-Japan Economic Relations (1994) was a
joint statement of CED and its Japanese coun-
terpart Keizai Doyukai. This report has been
cited as being especially influential in helping
shape recent U.S.-Japan trade agreements.
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1INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this policy statement is to
identify, define, and make recommendations
on the main economic policy issues in the
Asia-Pacific region as a basis for a coordi-
nated U.S. business position. The perspectives
of Asian business leaders on many of the
issues were put forward at the Pacific Leaders
Forum convened by the Committee for Eco-
nomic Development (CED) in Seattle in Octo-
ber 1996 in cooperation with the National Cen-
ter for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC). In this statement, an effort is made to
take those views into account, but responsibil-
ity for the statement rests entirely with CED.
The Asia-Pacific area has been transformed
into the most dynamic economic region of the
world. The American economic stake in the
region is enormous. It is the fastest-growing
and largest market for U.S. products, exceed-
ing the combined size of the Canadian and
Mexican markets, the two largest non-Asian
markets for U.S. goods. U.S. trade across the
Pacific has surpassed trade across the Atlantic
for more than a decade (see Figure 1). Direct
investment in the region by U.S. firms has
been increasing at a more rapid rate than in
any other area abroad. Moreover, because of
its high-saving economies, the region has be-
come the main source of capital to make up
the continuing gap between what the United
States spends and what it produces (i.e., the
deficit in the U.S. current balance-of-payments
account).
Because the economies of the area have
grown in recent years at more than twice the
rate of any other region, the World Bank has
referred to this development as “The East
Asian Miracle.” Accounting for the bulk of the
area’s growth are eight countries: Japan, China
(now including Hong Kong), Taiwan, Korea,
and four Southeast Asian countries (Indone-
sia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand). Over
Figure 1
U.S. Trade with Asia Has Outpaced
Trade with Europe
1989 to 1995
Billions of U.S. Dollars
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade
Statistics Yearbook (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary
Fund, 1996).
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2the past several years, the Philippines has also
experienced impressive economic progress,
and Vietnam may well emerge as the next
economic frontier in East Asia with the poten-
tial of becoming another “Asian tiger.”
Asia’s success has been driven by the pri-
vate sector. It is the result of the entrepreneur-
ial activities of thousands of small, medium,
and large business firms, both domestic and
foreign, that have mobilized capital, technol-
ogy, and managerial skills and applied them
in innovative ways throughout the region.
At the same time, governments in the
region have played a vital supportive role. In
general, they have provided a responsible fis-
cal and monetary environment that has en-
couraged high rates of national saving. They
have also placed high priority on education
and improving the physical and institutional
infrastructure, including strengthening the rule
of law and reforming archaic financial sys-
tems. Agricultural policies have stressed pro-
ductivity and have avoided excessive taxation
of the rural economy.
Selective public subsidies and other inter-
ventions to foster specific industries and to
encourage exports have been common in the
region. However, the thrust of policy in recent
years has been toward greater market orienta-
tion, including domestic deregulation and
reduction of the substantial barriers to inter-
national trade and investment that have pre-
vailed in the area.
Any explanation of the Asia-Pacific
region’s economic success must include the
favorable external environment. Growth has
been heavily dependent on open world mar-
kets bolstered by a rule-based global trading
system espoused and promoted by the United
States. Especially important has been the
assurance of a relatively open U.S. market,
which, until the early 1990s, ranked at or near
the top as an export destination for most East
Asian countries.
Although the rapidly rising economic
strength of the Asia-Pacific region is what has
impelled the stepped-up U.S. engagement in
the area, there are also vital security and
political dimensions to the U.S. interest. For
example, China’s very rapid economic growth
is accompanied by a rapid of increase in its
military expenditures. A major priority, there-
fore, is to build a solid political and economic
relationship with China in order to forestall a
future Pacific version of the Cold War.
More generally, peace and stability cannot
be taken for granted in the Asia-Pacific area. It
is a region with a history of adversarial rela-
tions among its major powers—Japan, China,
and Russia—and keen memories of aggres-
sion and occupation in the smaller states. Since
1941, the United States has fought three major
wars in the region. Flashpoints in North
Korea or the Taiwan Strait could erupt at any
time.
In addition to continuing to maintain a
substantial military presence in Asia as a sta-
bilizing force, the United States supports and
participates in the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF) as a mechanism for facilitating commu-
nication and building trust on security mat-
ters.1 Over the longer run, however, one of the
best ways for the United States to prevent
armed conflict and promote peace in the
Pacific is to be engaged politically and to en-
courage a high degree of economic integra-
tion and interdependence through the mutual
opening of markets to foreign trade and in-
vestment.
U.S. business has played a major role in
the economic development of the Asia-Pacific
region through trade, investment, technology
transfer, and partnerships with domestic firms.
1. The nine members of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) are: Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,
Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
3In addition, it has worked closely with gov-
ernments and private firms in the region to
improve the infrastructure for business. Tech-
nical assistance has been provided in fields
such as company law, accounting, informa-
tion and telecommunications services, and
financial systems, including banking, security
markets, and insurance.
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) forum is the principal regional
vehicle through which the U.S. government
relates to the economies of the Asia-Pacific
area collectively.2 However, when APEC be-
gan, it was as much a political enterprise as it
was an economic initiative. Its impetus was to
begin to create a sense of commonality in a
region that, unlike Western Europe, is politi-
cally, culturally, and socially diverse. In the
United States, APEC is helping to build a
heightened public consciousness about the
importance of Asia to this country and its
future. It has also provided a valuable forum
for the United States to listen to and learn
about Asian perspectives and to expound long-
held principles of its own.
 APEC’s objective of free trade and invest-
ment early in the twenty-first century is far-
reaching in its implications for both the coun-
tries of the region and the rest of the world.
Concurrently with the APEC initiative, the
results of the Uruguay Round are coming
into force, and bold new regional economic
arrangements are being forged in the Western
Hemisphere and other parts of the world.
These pathbreaking developments in the re-
gime for international trade and investment
are the backdrop against which the issues for
the CED project on Asia need to be consid-
ered.
The Asia-Pacific region represents extraor-
dinary opportunities as well as many chal-
lenges for U.S. business and, therefore, also
for American workers, investors, and consum-
ers. Seizing the opportunities and managing
the challenges will require a sustained,
thoughtful, steady set of policies and an
equally sustained and clear explanation on
the part of our leaders of the importance over
the long term of what is happening in the
region. Only in this way will it be possible to
build the base of support that is essential not
only for the economic policies we deal with
specifically but also for the broader political
and security policies that underpin them.
* * *
This policy statement deals with some of
the major economic issues facing Pacific coun-
tries, including how to manage the surge of
capital flows, how to implement more open
trade policies, and how to resolve such diffi-
cult issues as human rights, intellectual prop-
erty concerns, varying labor standards, and
corruption.
The report offers a variety of recommen-
dations for national governments and inter-
national institutions. For the United States,
perhaps our most important assertion is that
this country should craft a new approach to
dealing with the Asia-Pacific region — an
approach that backs away from unilateral sanc-
tions and bilateral battles in resolving trade
disputes, including those with Japan and
China. Instead, we urge the United States to
take advantage of the new international dis-
pute-settling mechanism of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), which is proving fair
and effective in resolving conflicts and open-
ing markets.
This statement emphasizes the critical im-
portance of integrating China into the interna-
2. The member economies of the Asia-Pacific Economic Coop-
eration (APEC) are: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China,
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand,
Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea,
Taiwan, Thailand, and the United States.
4tional trading community, and we support
China’s entry into the WTO, provided it abides
by basic international trade and investment
standards.
As for our important economic relation-
ship with Japan, while we urge more use of
the WTO in settling disputes, the United States
should continue bilateral efforts with Japan to
break down impediments resulting from the
actions of private firms to restrict foreign trade
and investment.
We also warn against letting concern over
U.S. trade deficits with individual countries
derail efforts to broaden trade and investment
with Asia. U.S. trade and investment policy
should focus on specific impediments to trade
and investment rather than on bilateral sur-
pluses or deficits with the United States.
5CAPITAL FLOWS
Foreign investment and international trade
are the principal means through which indi-
vidual nations interact economically. Tradi-
tionally, trade was considered the engine of
growth in the world economy, increasing at
more than twice the rate of growth of world
production. Over the past two decades, how-
ever, the rate of increase of trade has been
greatly outpaced by the rapid rise of foreign
direct investment (FDI). The difference was
especially marked in East Asia and the Pacific
(see Figure 2).
Moreover, many foreign markets are served
more by foreign affiliates of multinational cor-
porations than by exports. For U.S.-based
firms, local sales of overseas affiliates have
exceeded U.S. exports by a factor of more than
two to one.3
In addition, much of foreign trade consists
of intrafirm trade—that is, transactions be-
tween a parent firm located in one country
and its affiliates in other countries. In the case
of the United States, intrafirm trade by multi-
national corporations accounted for almost 50
percent of U.S. exports and 55 percent of U.S.
merchandise imports in 1991.4 In short, in
today’s global economy, international trade
and investment are inextricably linked.
3. Edward M. Graham, Global Corporations and National Govern-
ments (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics,
May 1996), p. 13.
4. Graham, Global Corporations and National Governments, p. 14.
Figure 2
Foreign Direct Investment and Total
Exports, East Asia and the Pacific
Developing Countries
1988 to 1995
Billions of U.S. Dollars, Log Scale
SOURCE: World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1996, vol. 2
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1996), p. 196
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6ROLES OF DOMESTIC AND
FOREIGN CAPITAL
In Asia, the demand for capital is enor-
mous. Much of this capital is required to fi-
nance the vast new physical infrastructure
needed to keep up with soaring economic
growth. This includes not only economic in-
frastructure, such as transport, power, and
telecommunications, but social infrastructure
such as schools, hospitals, housing, and water
systems. The World Bank estimates that in-
frastructure investment alone for the Asia-
Pacific area will be around $2 trillion over the
next decade.
Historically, infrastructure investment has
been the domain of governments and interna-
tional public financial institutions such as the
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.
Now, however, with the demand for infra-
structure so enormous and pressing, govern-
ments are turning increasingly to the private
sector, both domestic and foreign, to get many
projects off the ground.
With the region’s domestic saving averag-
ing more than 32 percent of the gross domes-
tic product (GDP),5 most of the capital needs
of the region are being financed internally.
Only about 4 percent of all investment in East
Asia over the next ten years is expected to be
financed by foreign capital.6
Efficient use of domestic resources can be
substantially enhanced in Asia by improve-
ments in the infrastructure for financial inter-
mediation between savers and investors. Al-
though commercial banks are likely to remain
dominant for some time, nonbank intermedi-
aries, such as insurance companies and pen-
sion funds, are potentially important sources
of long-term finance. However, Asian finan-
cial systems need improvements in their le-
gal, accounting, and regulatory regimes as
well as effective rules for fuller disclosure.
The World Bank, in collaboration with pri-
vate business, should play a leading part in
providing technical assistance for these pur-
poses.
Despite its modest quantitative contribu-
tion to total investment in Asia, foreign capi-
tal has played a critical role, especially when
the capital flow has been in the form of pri-
vate direct investment. In 1995, net private
capital flows to East Asia and the Pacific
amounted to $98.1 billion, of which 55 percent
was FDI.7 Along with FDI have come vital
nonquantifiable resources in the form of new
technology, know-how, management skills,
and global marketing knowledge and facili-
ties. It is the totality of these resource flows
that has made foreign investment a driving
force in global development.
ASYMMETRY IN NET CAPITAL
FLOWS
Over the past decade, Japan has emerged
as the world’s largest net exporter of capital,
and the United States has become the world’s
largest importer of capital. These flows are
simply the counterpart of the current-account
surpluses earned by Japan ($67 billion in 1996)
and deficits incurred by the United States ($165
billion in 1996).8 The current-account balances
reflect in turn the differences between national
saving and investment in each country. No
other country in the Asia-Pacific area remotely
approaches Japan and the United States in
terms of the absolute size of its global current-
account imbalance.
America and Japan have attempted to co-
ordinate their macroeconomic policies with a
view to reducing their current-account imbal-
ances. In the Framework Talks held by the
two governments in 1993-94, expansionary
5. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, Octo-
ber 1996 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1996),
Table A44, p. 237.
6. World Bank, “Skyrocketing Global Interest Rates on the
Horizon? Not Likely . . ., “ Policy and Research Bulletin 7, No. 3
(July-September 1996), p. 4.
7. World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1996 (Washington, D.C.:
World Bank 1996), Vol. I Tables 1.2 and 1.4.
8. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, May
1997 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1997),
Table A27, p. 167.
7fiscal policies were recommended for Japan,
and contractionary policies were proposed for
the United States.* Similar recommendations
to dampen the budgetary imbalances were
included in a 1994 joint CED-Keizai Doyukai
(Japan Association of Corporate Executives)
policy statement.9 However, Japan’s fiscal sur-
pluses of the late 1980s and early 1990s have
been converted into substantial deficits as a
result of a three-year economic slump and the
public costs of reconstruction after the devas-
tating Kobe earthquake.
Under these changed conditions, a new
mechanism for discussion of mutual macro-
economic problems has been established in
the form of the Group of Six (G-6), an Asian
counterpart of the Group of Seven. Consisting
originally of the United States, Japan, China,
Singapore, Australia, and Hong Kong, the
group will meet annually to discuss a wide
range of financial issues.
Unlike the United States, Japan has a high
rate of private saving. This has allowed its
budgetary deficit to be easily financed inter-
nally while permitting a continuing high rate
of domestic private investment as well as net
foreign investment, as reflected in ongoing
surpluses in its balance of payments on cur-
rent account.
Japan’s high rate of private saving has been
justified on both internal and external grounds.
Within Japan, many see it as essential to fi-
nance the future retirement needs of one of
the world’s most rapidly aging populations.**
Externally, Japan’s excess saving is welcomed
by many poorer Asia-Pacific countries as a
vital supplement to their own internally gen-
erated capital in helping to finance their steeply
expanding development programs. From this
standpoint, Japan is seen as fulfilling the
proper role of a mature wealthy economy.
On the other hand, the United States is
regarded by many developing countries as
irresponsible in running large balance-of-pay-
ments deficits financed by drawing down the
pool of international capital and accumulat-
ing a huge external liability amounting to $700
billion at the end of 1995.10 In terms of its own
interests as well, the cumulation of U.S. cur-
rent-account deficits is unfortunate. It entails
a buildup of liabilities to the rest of the world
that have to be serviced. The current trend is
for an increasing volume of U.S. income to be
paid out to foreigners and thus to be unavail-
able for domestic consumption and invest-
ment. The best way for the United States to
correct its balance-of-payments deficit is to
increase its national saving. Elimination of
the U.S. budget deficit would be the most
effective contribution to that objective in the
medium term.11 Fortunately, a strong economy
and sustained attention to deficit reduction in
the past several years have reduced the deficit
to less than one percent of GDP.
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
The economic development of the original
“Asian tigers” (Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, and
Hong Kong) was facilitated by foreign financ-
ing, primarily in the form of official assis-
tance. However, the inflow of foreign capital
to today’s rapidly growing Asian developing
countries consists overwhelmingly of private
capital, of which FDI is the largest single com-
ponent (see Figure 3, page 8).
The direct investment presence of the
United States in the Asia-Pacific region has
grown substantially, amounting at the end of
1995 to almost $126 billion, concentrated
mainly in manufacturing. As host to Ameri-
can FDI, Asia-Pacific lags far behind Europe
but now exceeds Latin America by a small
9. From Promise to Progress: Towards a New Stage in U.S.-Japan
Economic Relations (1994).
10. Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the
President (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
February 1997), Table B-105.
11. This is a long-standing CED position. Its most recent ex-
pression is contained in the CED policy statement, Growth With
Opportunity (1997), pages 7 and 10.
*See memorandum by RODERICK M. HILLS, (page 37).
**See memorandum by RODERICK M. HILLS, (page 37).
8margin.12 Moreover, the preeminent position
among foreign direct investors in the region is
held by Japan, not by the United States.
U.S.-JAPAN DISPARITY. A striking fea-
ture of the distribution of FDI in the region
centers on Japan. Although the 1994 total stock
of Japanese FDI worldwide was $463 billion,
Japan was host cumulatively to only $34 bil-
lion of FDI from all sources.13  Perhaps the
most telling indicator of Japan’s anomalous
position in terms of the foreign presence in its
economy is the proportion of domestic sales
provided by foreign-owned firms in Japan
compared with other countries: 1.2 percent in
Japan, 16.4 percent in the United States, 14.0
percent in Germany, 24.1 percent in the United
Kingdom, and 28.4 percent in France.14  Given
the strong positive relationship between FDI
and trade, the low level of FDI in Japan un-
doubtedly exacerbates the trade tensions be-
tween Japan and other countries.
Although Japan has ended formal restric-
tions on inward foreign investment, we be-
lieve the extremely small presence of foreign
enterprises can be explained, at least in part,
by informal administrative restrictions and
private barriers. The U.S. government should
continue to press the government of Japan to
take energetic steps to remove such barriers.
Figure 3
Net Long-Term Capital Flows to East Asian and Pacific Developing Countries
1988 to 1996
Billions of U.S. Dollars
SOURCE: World Bank, Global Development Finance, 1997, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997), p. 192; World Bank,
World Debt Tables, 1996, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1996).
12. U.S. Department of Commerce, “U.S. Direct Investment
Abroad,” Survey of Current Business (September 1996): Table
11.3.
13. Keizai Koho Center, Japan 1996: An International Comparison
(Tokyo, 1996), Table 5-11. Data are from Japan’s Ministry of
Finance.
14. Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the Presi-
dent (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Feb-
ruary 1994), Table 6.5, p. 216.
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9The bilateral U.S. approach to Japan on
this issue should be bolstered by multilat-
eral action once the Multilateral Agreement
on Investment (MAI) comes into being. The
MAI is in an advanced stage of negotiation in
the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD). In addition to call-
ing for national treatment (that is, the same
conditions as those accorded to domestic firms)
it is likely to provide facilities for the settle-
ment of investment disputes. Included would
be provisions for compensatory monetary
damages in the case of investor-state disputes
and retaliation in the case of state-state dis-
putes.
POLICIES OF EMERGING COUNTRIES
AFFECTING FDI. There are two types of pub-
lic policies that affect the attractiveness of host
countries to foreign direct investors: general
economic policies that condition the environ-
ment for business and specific host-country
policies intended to promote or control FDI.
The most important general policies con-
ducive to foreign investment are macroeco-
nomic stability; transparency, and predictabil-
ity of government regulation; equal treatment
for domestic and foreign enterprises; and
avoidance of restrictive trade policies. Coun-
tries interested in attracting foreign invest-
ment should pay particular attention to en-
suring these basic conditions.
The most widely used special policy aimed
directly at foreign investors is fiscal incen-
tives, whether in the form of tax concessions
or government subsidies. Although fiscal in-
centives are commonly regarded in develop-
ing countries as essential to attract foreign
investors, it is open to question whether their
benefits outweigh their fiscal costs.
Fiscal incentives for FDI distort the flow of
foreign capital and encourage costly unpro-
ductive competition among developing coun-
tries in order to attract foreign investment.
Moreover, they violate the basic principle of
equal treatment for domestic and foreign firms.
At bottom, most multinational companies look
more to a country’s general and more endur-
ing economic institutions and policies than to
fiscal incentives, which can be given by one
administration and taken away by the next.
However, incentives are a fact of life. When
granted, they should be available equally to
domestic and foreign investors.
Another type of fiscal policy affecting the
flow of FDI is intergovernmental agreements
to avoid double taxation of foreign investors.
Such agreements involve difficult questions,
including issues of valuation relating to trans-
fer pricing. Nevertheless, an attempt should
be made in APEC or some other forum to
develop principles to govern the division of
tax revenue between host and home govern-
ments.
Of course, not all government policies di-
rected specifically at multinational firms are
for the purpose of promoting FDI. Some are
intended to control the behavior of foreign
companies in various ways. Known as perfor-
mance requirements, they include prohibiting
FDI in certain sectors, limiting foreign equity
participation, requiring a minimum percent-
age of local content in production, and man-
dating a minimum volume of exports.
Performance requirements were on the
agenda of the Uruguay Round negotiations,
but most of them were deemed beyond the
scope of the existing rules of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In
the end, the round succeeded in banning only
local-content and trade-balancing require-
ments (after a transition period) on the grounds
of their inconsistency with GATT rules and
their adverse effect on the efficiency of opera-
tion of foreign-owned enterprises.
Trade-balancing requirements mandate
that a firm offset the foreign exchange cost of
its imports by earning foreign exchange
through exports. The purpose of local-content
requirements is to protect existing host-coun-
try domestic industries that supply parts and
intermediate products to affiliates of multina-
tionals or to encourage the establishment or
expansion of such industries (backward link-
10
ages). However, by forcing foreign affiliates to
buy local supplies when imports may be
cheaper or better, local-content requirements
reduce the efficiency of foreign-owned firms
and their ability to export competitively in
world markets. In CED’s view, there are steps
that a host government can take to promote
domestic supplying industries, such as pro-
viding credit and training facilities, without
resorting to local-content requirements or
other forms of protection.
Unfortunately, there is a significant risk,
especially with respect to the automotive sec-
tor, that some countries in the Asia-Pacific
region (Malaysia and Indonesia, for example)
will not meet their Uruguay Round commit-
ments to eliminate these nontariff barriers by
January 1, 2000. The U.S. government should
give high priority to oversight of on-time
compliance with the agreement reached to
phase out local-content and trade-balancing
requirements.
 Beyond these regulations, which are cov-
ered by the World Trade Organization
(WTO), performance requirements for for-
eign investment should be made subject to
international discipline. However, pending
the negotiation of a global or APEC invest-
ment code (see “Investment Code” pages 10-
11), the United States should intensify its
bilateral investment treaty program with par-
ticular attention to countries in the Asia-
Pacific region. U.S. bilateral investment trea-
ties include many of the key elements of
projected multilateral codes, such as rights of
establishment and national treatment.
FINANCIAL SERVICES.  Major advances
have been made in privatizing and liberaliz-
ing financial systems in Asia-Pacific. How-
ever, American financial institutions still face
troubling barriers, especially in Japan, China,
South Korea, and Taiwan. The barriers con-
sist of obstacles to entry and discrimination
relative to domestic firms once the institu-
tions are established. Efforts in the Uruguay
Round to open up markets to foreign finan-
cial institutions as part of the negotiations on
trade in services ended in a standoff. Rather
than holding up the whole Uruguay Round
agreement, the parties agreed to continue ne-
gotiations for six months after the effective
date of the agreement in January 1995. A fi-
nancial services agreement satisfactory to the
United States could not be reached at that
time, but the negotiations were resumed in
April 1997.
The United States accords national treat-
ment to foreign financial institutions and is
seeking similar treatment for American finan-
cial institutions abroad. In the Uruguay Round
and in subsequent negotiations, the United
States reserved the right to withhold national
and most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment for
new investments in financial services from
countries that discriminate against the opera-
tions of American and other foreign financial
institutions. CED recommends that the U.S.
government refrain at this time from invok-
ing its right to discriminate against foreign
financial institutions while continuing to
press for foreign liberalization of financial
services.* **
INVESTMENT CODE.  Despite the pri-
mary role of foreign investment in the global-
ization of the world economy, no multilateral
institution comparable to GATT and the WTO
exists to provide a framework of norms and a
mechanism for resolving conflicts and remov-
ing obstacles to international investment.
Over time, the WTO may successfully
sponsor the negotiation of a global invest-
ment code, thereby converting the WTO into
a World Investment and Trade Organization
(WITO). In the meantime, regional investment
codes already exist de facto in the European
Union and in the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) in the form of compre-
hensive safeguards for the rights of foreign
investors. And the OECD is sponsoring the
negotiation of a MAI applying to its mem-
bers, a process in which the business commu-
nity has actively participated through the Busi-
*See memorandum by HARRY L. FREEMAN, (page 37).
**See memorandum by MARTIN B. ZIMMERMAN,
(page 37).
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ness-Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC).
The question is whether progress toward a
universal investment code can be accelerated
by pursuing that objective on a regional basis
in the Asia-Pacific area. An APEC investment
code was proposed by the Pacific Economic
Cooperation Council (PECC) in a draft sub-
mitted to the APEC ministers in 1993. In 1994,
a set of “nonbinding investment principles”
was adopted, but half of them fall short of
desirable international standards. Other APEC
advisory groups have also recommended the
formulation of an investment code by APEC
which could initially be adopted voluntarily
by each of its members.
In a report to the APEC economic leaders
submitted prior to the Subic Bay Summit meet-
ing in November 1996, the APEC Business
Advisory Council (ABAC)15 made an innova-
tive proposal for strengthening investment
standards. In addition to improving the non-
binding principles, ABAC recommended the
establishment of APEC Voluntary Investment
Projects (AVIPs). Under this system, APEC
economies can voluntarily apply a specific set
of principles for enhanced investment protec-
tion to selected individual projects above and
beyond the protection afforded by the non-
binding investment principles. The induce-
ment for establishing AVIPs is that financial
markets reward strong investment-protection
regimes with lower financial costs.  CED en-
dorses the AVIP proposal as a practical in-
terim device for advancing investment pro-
tection in the APEC region. However, AVIPs
are no substitute for a global rule of law in
investment, and we urge APEC nations to
adopt an investment code based on interna-
tional norms as soon as possible.
Although the November 1994 Bogor Dec-
laration of APEC heads of state did not in-
clude explicit endorsement of a formal invest-
ment code for the region, its stated goal was
“free and open trade and investment in Asia
Pacific no later than the year 2020.” 16 If we
interpret the Bogor Declaration as approval in
principle of an APEC investment code, what
should be the U.S. role? In developing an APEC
code, the U.S. government should refrain from
putting its own draft on the table at the outset.
The specifics of the code should emerge from
discussions among APEC government officials
with the active participation of business rep-
resentatives from member countries. At the
technical level, however, liaison should be
established with the OECD committee cur-
rently at work on the MAI for its members.
In developing an investment code, national
and MFN treatment for foreign investors
should, of course, be the basic norm. Among
the other issues to be resolved are: how to
define permitted exceptions to the right of
establishment (e.g., for national security);
whether special government incentives or dis-
incentives that distort international capital
flows should be discouraged; whether limita-
tions should be categorically barred on the
remittance of profits and royalties and on the
repatriation of capital; whether common prin-
ciples should be established to guide transfer
pricing; whether, and the extent to which,
subfederal units (state and local jurisdictions)
should be bound by the code; whether facili-
ties for mandatory arbitration should be es-
tablished to resolve recalcitrant investment
disputes; and whether the code should be bind-
ing or voluntary.
INTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIO
INVESTMENT
Portfolio investment consists of cross-bor-
der private flows of capital that, unlike FDI,
do not imply management control over the
foreign project or enterprise that is the object
of the financing. Included in portfolio invest-
ment are commercial bank lending, bond pur-
chases, and equity investment.
15. ABAC consists of three business representatives from each
APEC country.
16. APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration of Common Resolve
(Bogor, Indonesia, December 15, 1994).
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The composition of portfolio flows to de-
veloping countries has changed radically over
the past 20 years. In the 1970s, portfolio fi-
nancing was channeled primarily from for-
eign commercial banks to governments. When
the debt crisis erupted in the early 1980s, pri-
vate financing to government borrowers in
the developing world virtually dried up, and
potential investors were also wary of lending
to private borrowers in those countries. With
the recent improvement in the macroeconomic
and regulatory environment in many devel-
oping countries, portfolio flows have revived.
However, most of the funds have gone to
private borrowers, and the source of financ-
ing has largely shifted from banks to nonbanks
(especially mutual and pension funds) through
the vehicles of bond issues and equity invest-
ment.
Portfolio flows to developing countries
have increased dramatically in recent years,
from $7.5 billion in 1989 to $55.8 billion in
1993.17 Although most of the financing has
consisted of debt instruments (bonds, certifi-
cates of deposit, and commercial paper), in-
vestment in equities has also risen rapidly,
tripling to $13.2 billion during the 1989-1993
period.18
The explosive growth of portfolio invest-
ment in developing countries has been largely
confined to a select group of countries in Latin
America and Asia-Pacific. In the latter region,
83 percent of bond flows in 1994 went to China,
Korea, and Thailand; and 82 percent of equity
flows went to China, Korea, and Indonesia.19
Inward capital flows are strongly corre-
lated with economic growth and macroeco-
nomic stability in recipient countries. How-
ever, they also reflect the state of liberalization
of financial markets, especially the extent of
controls on cross-border financial flows. De-
veloping countries in Asia should be en-
couraged to gradually remove restrictions on
capital inflows as an important step in wid-
ening the range of countries benefiting from
the ability to draw on foreign savings.
In recent years, the sources of portfolio
capital flows have become quite diversified.
They include mutual funds, institutional in-
vestors such as pension funds and life insur-
ance companies, securities traders, and citi-
zens of host countries living abroad. This
diversity reduces the risk of a sudden and
simultaneous drying up of flows such as oc-
curred with commercial bank loans in the
1980s. However, the volume and sources of
portfolio flows could be expanded by the re-
laxation in source countries of regulations,
often at the state level in the United States, on
the investment policies of insurance compa-
nies and other institutional investors. Steps
along these lines to liberalize capital out-
flows should be seriously considered by the
United States and other industrial countries,
consistent with the fiduciary responsibili-
ties of their regulators.
Unlike debt instruments, whether in the
form of bonds or traditional commercial bank
loans, foreign investment in equities has the
advantage of matching service payments (i.e.,
dividends) to ability to pay, thereby serving
as an effective instrument for sharing risk be-
tween the provider and the recipient of capi-
tal. A growing number of developing coun-
tries have established stock markets which
have facilitated the mobilization of risk fi-
nance and contributed to improved corporate
financial structures.
17. Another perspective on the pull of these capital markets
was given by Malcolm Binks, Senior Vice President of Merrill
Lynch International, at the Pacific Leaders Forum in Seattle on
October l, 1996. Of the $750 billion invested in Merrill Lynch
accounts, the proportion invested outside the United States
(much of it in Asia-Pacific markets) rose from 3 percent to 10
percent in just five years.
18. Stijn Claessens and Sudarshan Gooptu, “Can Developing
Countries Keep Capital Flowing In?,” Finance and Development
(September 1994, published by the World Bank and IMF).
19. James Riedel, “Capital Market Integration in Developing
Asia,” forthcoming in The World Economy, 1997, Vol. 20, No. 1,
Tables 4 and 5. (Based on data in World Bank, World Debt
Tables, 1996.)
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Despite the striking advances made by ma-
jor emerging equity markets in the develop-
ing world, the state of many others discour-
ages both domestic and foreign investors.
These markets are characterized by high con-
centration and volatility, lack of liquidity, in-
adequate disclosure and regulation, and weak
capacity to enforce rules.
APEC should cooperate with the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) in a program to improve these condi-
tions by assisting governments to establish
adequate institutional, legal, and regulatory
structures for the proper functioning of do-
mestic securities markets. As a first step,
APEC should establish a new Working Group
on Capital Markets to gather data on existing
conditions in member countries and to make
recommendations directed initially to the
improvement of their equity markets.
The financial crisis that erupted in Mexico
in late 1994 underlines the vulnerability of
emerging markets to misguided domestic mac-
roeconomic policies, especially in economies
that have experienced large inflows of volatile
foreign capital. The dangers include excessive
expansion of money and credit, increased in-
flation, appreciation of the real exchange rate,
and a deterioration in the current account.
The support package of $50 billion hastily
arranged for Mexico by the United States was
a one-shot ad hoc operation that is unlikely to
be repeated. In order to forestall the sudden
loss of investor confidence in a country’s fi-
nances, such as the Mexican peso crisis of 1994,
the IMF has been working on a two-tier ap-
proach: First, it has developed a monitoring
and early-warning system in the form of a set
of standards to improve the timely distribu-
tion of financial data by governments. Second,
it has sponsored a negotiation among its mem-
bers to enlarge by $47 billion the original $24
billion General Arrangements to Borrow
(GAB), so that lines of credit would be avail-
able in an emergency to protect the currencies
not only of the major industrial powers but
also of cooperating developing countries.
Under the expanded GAB, the U.S. com-
mitment would rise by 58 percent, from $6.16
billion to $9.73 billion. Although the increase
would require Congressional approval, it
would not entail any actual U.S. budget out-
lay or add to the federal deficit. If the GAB
were activated, the United States would lend,
not to the country in crisis, but to the IMF. The
loan would be secured, therefore, by the IMF’s
own financial reserves, including billions of
dollars’ worth of gold. In our view, the ex-
panded IMF emergency fund constitutes a
constructive multilateral response to future
Mexico-type financial crises. We recommend
its prompt approval by the U.S. Congress.*
OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT
FINANCE
In terms of dollar volume, Japan is the num-
ber-one provider of official development
assistance globally ($13,396 million in 1995).
The United States is a distant third ($7,187
million), ranking slightly behind France ($7,437
million).20
As a provider of assistance specifically in
Asia, Japan overshadows all other countries.
Almost 62 percent of Japanese foreign aid went
to Asia in the 1994-1995 period, compared
with less than 17 percent of U.S. assistance.
The major individual recipients are China, In-
donesia, India, the Philippines, and Thailand.21
The heavy concentration of Japanese aid in
Asia can be ascribed to historical ties, geo-
graphic proximity, and an exceptionally high
correlation between the directions of Japan’s
aid and trade.
Neither the United States nor Japan is par-
ticularly generous as an aid giver if the crite-
20. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Development Cooperation 1996 (Paris: OECD, 1997). Annex Table
6a. The figures are expressed in 1994 prices and exchange rates.
21. OECD, Development Cooperation 1996, Annex Tables 41 and
42.
*See memorandum by RODERICK M. HILLS, (page 37).
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rion of generosity is official development
assistance (ODA) as a percentage of gross na-
tional product (GNP). By that standard, Japan’s
0.28 percent only slightly exceeds the average
of 0.27 percent for all donor countries of the
OECD. The United States ranks lowest of
OECD aid givers, spending only 0.10 percent
of its annual GNP for ODA.22
The volume of American ODA in 1995 fell
37 percent below its 1992 level and is likely to
decline further.23 An evaluation of U.S. for-
eign aid performance by the OECD Develop-
ment Assistance Committee (DAC) reflects
alarm over the sharp decline. According to the
DAC, this seeming withdrawal from tradi-
tional leadership is so grave that it “poses
a risk of undermining political support for
development cooperation” in other donor
countries.24
The case for U.S. economic assistance
abroad has always rested on multiple objec-
tives: promoting economic development in
low-income countries; meeting emergency
needs in the world’s poorest nations; expand-
ing opportunities for U.S. trade and invest-
ment, and advancing U.S. strategic and politi-
cal interests. With the collapse of the Soviet
empire, however, there has been a shift in
emphasis from using aid to counter Cold War
rivals to supporting emerging democracies in
Eastern Europe and the independent states of
the former Soviet Union. High priority is also
being given to dealing with transnational prob-
lems such as environmental degradation and
rapid population growth.
U.S. assistance for development comprises
only half of one percent of the federal budget,
far less than estimated by the public in opin-
ion surveys. A concerted effort should be
made by the U.S. business community as
well as by the government to counter the
gross public overestimation of the share of
foreign assistance in the federal budget as
part of a program to raise the U.S. contribu-
tion while taking into account the need to
balance the budget.
In the case of Japan, the problem is not the
volume of aid but the way in which it is de-
ployed. The percentage of Japanese aid for-
mally tied to purchases from Japan is rela-
tively low, but much of the aid is informally
tied. This is accomplished by allocating aid to
specific projects or products for which Japan
has a competitive advantage or by requiring
that feasibility studies be carried out by Japa-
nese engineering firms with close ties to Japa-
nese trading and manufacturing companies.25
Because of these practices, critics have stated
that the Japanese aid program is designed
more to foster the commercial interests of the
donor nation than to stimulate economic de-
velopment in the recipient country. We be-
lieve that private Japanese business organi-
zations, concerned about the health of the
global economy, are in the best position to
influence Japanese aid policy to reduce its
trade-promotion orientation and increase its
development value to recipients.
22. OECD, Development Cooperation 1996, Annex Table 6a.
23. OECD, Development Cooperation 1996, Annex Table 20.
24. OECD Letter, April 1995, published by the OECD Informa-
tion and Publications Center, Washington, D.C.
25. Marcus Noland, Implications of Asian Economic Growth,
Working Paper Series, no. 94-5, (Washington, D.C.: Institute for
International Economics, 1995), p. 37.
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TRADE
Despite the dynamic role of rapidly increas-
ing foreign investment in Asia, trade (both
exports and imports) continues to play a criti-
cal part in the economic development of the
region, and issues of trade policy remain high
on the agenda of international economic ne-
gotiations. Moreover, multinational corpora-
tions seek not only a market presence in Asian
countries through foreign investment but also
unimpeded market access for their firms’ ex-
ports from production bases at home and else-
where within or outside the region.
U.S. TRADE BALANCES WITH THE
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
The United States has experienced large
global merchandise trade deficits continuously
for the past decade. Since 1991, the deficits,
which had been declining from their 1987 peak,
have again risen sharply. In 1996, the mer-
chandise trade deficit amounted to a record
$188 billion.26
If we disaggregate the U.S. global merchan-
dise trade deficit geographically, we find its
main locus to be in U.S. trade with East Asia
and the Pacific. As shown in Figure 4, the
Figure 4
U.S. Merchandise Trade Balance
with Selected East Asian and Pacific
Countries
(In Millions of Dollars)
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of
the United States: 1996 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1996); Office of Management and Budget,
Economic Report of the President (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, February 1997). For 1996 data,
U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business,
April 1997, p. 45, supplemented by unpublished Department
of Commerce data.
26. However, America has been running surpluses in service
trade in recent years. As a result of a services surplus of $73
billion, the 1996 balance on goods and services amounted to
$114 billion. But when the balances on investment income and
unilateral transfers (both negative) are taken into account, the
full current account for 1996 was a deficit of $165 billion. U.S.
Department of Commerce, U.S. International Transactions: Fourth
Quarter and Year 1996 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, March 13, 1997).
Country 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Brunei $424 $442 $330 $152 $326
Indonesia -1,750 -2,665 -3,712 -4,076 -4,273
Malaysia -3,831 -4,499 -7,012 -8,637 -9,283
Philippines -1,597 -1,364 -1,832 -1,712 -2,019
Singapore -1,687 -1,120 -2,339 -3,227 -4,089
Thailand -3,540 -4,775 -5,446 -4,683 -4,139
Vietnam 5 7 122 54 285
ASEAN
Total -11,976 -13,974 -19,889 -22,129 -23,192
Australia 5,188 4,979 6,581 7,466 7,816
China -18,309 -22,777 -29,494 -33,790 -39,553
Hong Kong -716 319 1,748 3,940 4,034
Japan -49,601 -59,355 -65,669 -59,137 -49,214
South Korea -2,043 -2,336 -1,629 1,196 3,001
Taiwan -9,346 -8,934 -9,633 -9,682 -12,385
East Asia
& Pacific
Total -86,803 -102,078 -117,985 -112,136 -109,493
World
Total -96,106 -132,609 -166,121 -173,424 -187,674
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United States has run a bilateral deficit with
most countries in that region. The exceptions
are Australia, Hong Kong, South Korea,
Brunei, and Vietnam. For the area as a whole,
the deficit was $109 billion in 1996, the bulk of
it concentrated in Japan ($49 billion), China
($40 billion), and Taiwan ($12 billion).
Should the United States worry about its
large and growing merchandise trade deficits
with East Asia and the Pacific? In particular,
should it mount a special effort to improve its
rapidly deteriorating bilateral merchandise
trade balance with China as it has done in the
past with Japan?
In considering this question, we should bear
in mind that the best indicator of a country’s
international economic position is not any par-
ticular bilateral trade balance but, rather, its
global current-account position. In addition
to merchandise trade, the current account re-
flects the balance in service trade, investment
income, and unilateral transfers. And in the
global context, a current-account surplus with
some countries may be offset by deficits with
others.
In the case of China, despite its $34 billion
bilateral merchandise trade surplus with the
United States in 1995,27 that country’s global
current-account surplus was only $1.6 billion,
an amount equal to two-tenths of one percent
of its GDP. And as shown in Figure 5, most of
the other countries in the Asia-Pacific region
experienced overall current-account deficits
in 1995 despite their trade surpluses with the
United States.
A final point to bear in mind is that a
country’s global current account is overwhelm-
ingly a function of its macroeconomic policy.
It reflects the balance between a nation’s ag-
gregate output and expenditure, a difference
largely determined by its fiscal, monetary, and
exchange rate policies. In the case of the United
States, the 1996 current-account deficit of $165
billion reflects mainly domestic conditions: the
combination of a low level of private saving
relative to private investment and a large
federal budget deficit.
Although global current-account imbal-
ances depend on macroeconomic policies, the
composition and direction of a country’s trade
can be substantially influenced by micro-
economic policy—that is, policy toward trade
and foreign investment, including import pro-
tection, export subsidization, and regulations
pertaining to foreign direct investment. U.S.
concerns should be focused, therefore, pri-
marily on specific Asian restrictions that
distort the pattern of foreign trade and in-
vestment rather than on Asian balance-of-
payments surpluses or deficits that largely
reflect domestic macroeconomic policies.
Figure 5
Current-Account Balances, 1995
(In Billions of U.S. Dollars)
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, International Financial
Statistics (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund,
October 1996).
27. U.S. official data seriously overstate the bilateral deficit with
China. U.S. sales to China via Hong Kong middlemen are
entered by the Department of Commerce as exports to Hong
Kong. But the Department counts as imports from China all
Chinese products reexported from Hong Kong to the United
States, including value added by Hong Kong companies. Ac-
cording to Nicholas Lardy, the China specialist at The Brookings
Institution, the upshot is that the real U.S. trade imbalance with
China in 1996 is likely to total about $25 billion, one-third less
than the $38 billion projected on the basis of U.S. government
data. Brookings Policy Brief, no. 10 (November 1996).
Country Amount Percent of GDP
United States -$148.2 -2.0
Japan 111.3 2.2
China 1.6 0.2
Hong Kong -4.9 -3.5
Singapore 15.1 17.8
Taiwan 4.8 1.8
Korea 8.3 1.8
Malaysiaa -4.1 -5.9
Thailand -13.6 -8.1
Philippines -2.0 -2.7
Indonesia -7.0 -3.5
Australia -19.2 -5.5
New Zealand -3.8 -6.3
(a) Data for Malaysia are for 1994.
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TRADE POLICIES OF DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES OF THE REGION
Most of the developing countries of the
Asia-Pacific region initially adopted the im-
port-substitution model of development. How-
ever, unlike Latin American countries, they
abandoned this protectionist strategy early in
favor of export-oriented growth policies. Trade
restrictions were substantially reduced, com-
petitive exchange rates were adopted, and a
variety of specific export-promotion measures
were introduced. A major recent advance in
liberalization is the commitment of many
Asian nations under the 1997 International
Telecommunications Agreement to join other
countries in opening their domestic markets
to international telecommunications services
and facilities.
Despite the growing openness of the Asia-
Pacific economies, substantial tariff and
nontariff barriers to market access remain. For-
eign companies face a wide range of restric-
tive measures not only in terms of market
access for their products but also in the form
of barriers to trade in services, obstacles to
investment, inadequate protection for intel-
lectual property, and anticompetitive practices
in the private sector.
In the past, U.S. policy has relied heavily
on ad hoc, bilateral and public efforts to open
Asian markets in specific areas. Although U.S.
clout, especially relative to the smaller Asian
economies, has often been effective in win-
ning concessions, the political fallout in those
countries has generally been negative. U.S.
approaches are widely seen as employing bul-
lying tactics, especially when bolstered by im-
plicit or explicit threats of trade sanctions.
Except for China and Taiwan,28 all APEC
members are also members of the new WTO
and are therefore subject to its rules. When a
bilateral trade dispute falls within the com-
petence of the WTO because a violation of
GATT rules is alleged, the United States
should resort to the improved WTO dispute-
settlement facility, which has worked well
since its inception in January 1995.
REGIONAL VERSUS GLOBAL
APPROACHES TO TRADE AND
INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION
As regional economic arrangements pro-
liferate around the world, a question arises:
Do these arrangements conflict with or un-
dermine the global liberalization that has been
pursued for almost half a century through
GATT? This issue becomes especially impor-
tant now that the Uruguay Round has been
successfully completed and GATT has been
converted into a strengthened WTO with
promising prospects for continued progress
in the multilateral dismantling of barriers to
trade and investment.
On the one hand, there are those who see
the institutionalization and widening of new
regional trade arrangements as a clear threat
to the existing global trade regime based on
the fundamental principle of equal treatment
for all nations. In Europe, the Economic Union
has been expanded from 12 to 15 members,
with a strong likelihood of further enlarge-
ment to include a number of countries in East-
ern Europe. In the Western Hemisphere,
numerous preferential regional arrangements
exist, such as NAFTA, Mercosur, and the
Andean group, and they are likely to consoli-
date over the next decade into a free trade
area of hemispheric scope. In Asia, the pro-
spective nine-country ASEAN free trade area
is being subsumed within the wider plans for
APEC free trade among 18 countries, with the
possibility of further enlargement in the fu-
ture. In Africa, too, a number of regional trade
groupings have been spawned.
The worry about these regional develop-
ments is threefold: First, by their nature, they
accord preferential treatment to their mem-
bers and therefore may harm other countries
by diverting trade from them. Particularly
28. China has applied for WTO membership. For a discussion
of this issue, see pages 24–26.
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onerous in this respect are industry-specific
rules of origin that increase protection for par-
ticular sectors, such as the NAFTA rules for
textiles, apparel, and automobiles. Second, by
centering the attention and energy of officials
on the complex tasks of negotiating the specif-
ics of the regional arrangements, the world-
wide approach to liberalization through GATT
and the new WTO may be neglected. Third, as
production becomes increasingly globalized,
the business horizons of multinational firms
are transcending not only national boundaries
but regional ones as well. Economic fragmen-
tation of the world through separate regional
economic arrangements could complicate in-
ternational trade and investment and pose
obstacles to efficient worldwide operations.
On the other hand, there is strong support
for the view that liberalization should be pur-
sued on all fronts, whether unilateral, bilat-
eral, regional, or global. According to this view,
the less-than-global approaches can be effec-
tive over time in facilitating and accelerating
the more difficult global moves to open trade
and investment, leading ultimately to deeper
worldwide economic integration. In smaller
groupings, progress is more feasible beyond
the reduction of tariffs and nontariff barriers.
Negotiations on such matters as intellectual
property rights, investment, product stan-
dards, and competition rules can move faster
within regional groups than within the WTO,
an organization of 128 members.29
GATT attempts to ensure that regional free
trade arrangements are consistent with multi-
lateral liberalization through certain conditions
set forth in Article XXIV of the agreement
relating to the formation of customs unions
and free trade areas. For example, the prefer-
ential treatment accorded to members of a
free trade area is to be achieved only by elimi-
nating trade barriers among members, not by
raising barriers against nonmembers.
In light of the spread of preferential ar-
rangements around the world, GATT Article
XXIV should be reviewed with the objective
of strengthening the contribution of regional
free trade areas to more open markets glo-
bally. By establishing the Committee on
Regionalism, the WTO has already taken a
first step to address concerns that proliferat-
ing regionalism could undermine the pros-
pects for further multilateral liberalization.
Thus far, however, the Committee has been
largely concerned with developing procedures
for better monitoring of regional arrangements
without dealing with the substance of Article
XXIV.30 In our view, the Committee on
Regionalism should also promptly address
the need to strengthen Article XXIV of GATT,
including the adoption of sharp limits on
the use of industry-specific rules of origin
that can exacerbate the trade-diversion
effects of regional trade arrangements.
ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC
COOPERATION FORUM
When APEC was launched in 1989 at
Australia’s initiative, it seemed as though it
would be just another forum for unfocused
talk and pious statements. However, with the
rapidly increasing economic importance of the
Asia-Pacific region, the Clinton Administra-
tion decided to throw its weight behind APEC.
It seized the opportunity of the U.S. chair-
manship in 1993 to upgrade the scheduled
meeting in Seattle from the level of ministers
to one of heads of state and decided to work
energetically with the other key governments
to help give APEC shape and substance.
To advance that objective, an advisory Emi-
nent Persons Group (EPG) was formed under
29. As of November 15, 1996, 28 additional countries, including
China and Russia, have applied for WTO membership.
30. The importance of better monitoring should not be mini-
mized. Of the 109 regional trade agreements notified to the
GATT under Article XXIV between 1948 and 1995, only 64
working parties had completed their reviews of the agree-
ments. Of those 64 working parties, only 6 reached a conclusion
as to the consistency of the regional trade agreements with the
conditions specified in Article XXIV. Jaime Sierra et al., Reflec-
tions on Regionalism for the WTO: A Report of the Carnegie Endow-
ment Study Group (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 1997).
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the chairmanship of C. Fred Bergsten, Direc-
tor of the Institute for International Econom-
ics. The EPG produced reports in 1993, 1994,
and 1995 which became a significant part of
the Summit meetings held in those years.
At the November 1994 Bogor Summit, the
United States and 17 other Pacific Rim coun-
tries31 agreed to remove trade and investment
restrictions by the year 2020, a move that
would transform the region into the world’s
largest free trade area. For the industrial coun-
tries of APEC, whose trade constitutes the
bulk of the area’s total trade, the target date
for complete liberalization is 2010.
The APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration
of Common Resolve at Bogor also empha-
sized the importance of an open system of
global trade and investment and pledged to
accelerate the implementation of the Uruguay
Round and “to undertake work aimed at deep-
ening and broadening” its outcome. The Dec-
laration also expressed the leaders’ determi-
nation “to pursue free and open trade and
investment in Asia-Pacific in a manner that
will encourage and strengthen trade and in-
vestment liberalization in the world as a
whole.” Thus, the heads of state at the Bogor
Summit saw APEC, not as an alternative, but
as a complement to multilateral negotiations
on trade and investment.
How to reach the APEC goals of free trade
and investment for the region was supposed
to be hammered out at the November 1995
Summit in Osaka, Japan. The results, how-
ever, fell short of U.S. initial expectations. In-
stead of a collectively agreed plan and time-
table, the leaders committed their governments
only to “individual action plans” consisting of
voluntary liberalization measures to be an-
nounced individually at the 1996 gathering in
the Philippines at Subic Bay. Compared to the
bold declarations at the 1994 Bogor meeting,
the Osaka results were a realistic reminder of
the difference between the “Asian way” and
the U.S. preference for a precise schedule for
meeting the announced trade- and investment-
liberalization goals.
To show their continuing commitment to
those goals, however, a number of countries
promised to speed up tariff reductions and
other trade-liberalizing measures that were
already under way. China went further and,
with an eye to its application for WTO mem-
bership, unilaterally stated that it would cut
tariffs in 1996 on more than 4,000 items by an
average of at least 30 percent. Since China’s
tariffs average about 40 percent, a 30 percent
reduction amounts to only 12 percentage
points.
On other fronts, Osaka initiated some use-
ful steps. It set the year 2000 for the simplifica-
tion of customs within the APEC region and
the establishment of a computerized database
of tariff information. The “Action Agenda”
also includes proposals for the liberalization
of government procurement, the simplifica-
tion and harmonization of standards, and
group efforts in critical infrastructure areas
such as telecommunications, transportation,
and energy. For example, it establishes an Asia-
Pacific Research Center to develop a model
for promoting much-needed investment in
power plants by removing institutional, regu-
latory, and procedural barriers.
At the Subic Bay 1996 Summit, APEC mem-
bers submitted individual action plans of vary-
ing significance. Although some plans con-
sisted of liberalization of specific products,
others were merely affirmations of trade mea-
sures already taken. Still other action plans
consisted of trade-facilitation measures rather
than liberalization per se. It remains to be seen,
therefore, how effective the voluntary
approach to broader trade liberalization will
be.
The modest steps toward liberalization
included in the individual action plans
announced at Subic Bay were almost com-
pletely overshadowed by what proved to be
31. The 18 members are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China,
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand,
Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea,
Taiwan, Thailand, and the United States.
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the centerpiece of the 1996 APEC Summit: the
U.S. proposal to eliminate tariffs on a wide
range of information technology products by
the year 2000. Despite initial resistance from
APEC’s less developed economies, President
Clinton’s personal intervention and lobbying
succeeded in producing a concluding declara-
tion by the APEC leaders endorsing a global
information technology agreement to be ne-
gotiated in the WTO. The agreement would
“substantially eliminate” tariffs on such goods
by 2000 while recognizing the “need for flex-
ibility” in the negotiations.
A promising development prior to the 1996
Summit was the establishment of the APEC
Business Advisory Council (ABAC) as a per-
manent private-sector advisory body to suc-
ceed the Pacific Business Forum. At its initial
meeting in Manila in June 1996, ABAC de-
cided to concentrate on five important areas:
cross-border flows of people, goods, services,
information, and capital; finance and invest-
ment within APEC; infrastructure; small and
medium enterprises and human resources
development; and economic and technical co-
operation. ABAC has already made valuable
practical recommendations on these subjects,
and we urge business leaders in all APEC
countries to give ABAC their strong support.
A number of issues will have to be faced as
APEC moves toward its stated goals:
1. On what basis should members be sort-
ed out for the target dates of 2010 and 2020?
Countries unequivocally classified as devel-
oped (the United States, Japan, Canada, Aus-
tralia, and New Zealand) are clearly subject to
the 2010 target. But what about Singapore,
which has a per capita income exceeding that
of New Zealand? And can Taiwan and South
Korea be considered today as other than in-
dustrialized economies?
In our view, a reasonable standard for
differentiating countries for the two target
dates would be a 1994 per capita income of
$10,000 based on World Bank purchasing
power parity (PPP) estimates.32 According to
this standard, all the aforementioned coun-
tries, including Taiwan and South Korea,
would be considered developed and subject
to the 2010 target, and all other APEC mem-
bers would qualify for the later date.
2. What should the commitment to free
and open trade cover? Should agriculture be
explicitly included? What about services?
As explained in the section on agriculture
(pages 26-27), reform of domestic agriculture
and liberalization of agricultural trade are
vital to the long-run health of the economies
of the region. As for services, they constitute
one of the most rapidly growing sectors in the
majority of APEC countries. Liberalization of
agriculture and services globally was among
the most important achievements of the
Uruguay Round negotiations. Agriculture and
services should certainly be included in the
APEC commitment to free trade.
3. How will nonmembers be treated?
Should the Eminent Persons Group’s proposal
for “open regionalism” be adopted? Essen-
tially, it would encourage APEC members to
liberalize individually to nonmembers either
unconditionally or on a mutually reciprocal
basis. The latter method could raise questions
of consistency with GATT rules. Another pos-
sibility is for groups of APEC members to
liberalize “cooperatively” to nonmembers.
 We believe APEC members should be
encouraged to reduce trade and investment
barriers to nonmembers even as they liberal-
ize internally. In order to avoid conflict with
the most-favored-nation principle of GATT
and to maximize APEC’s contribution to glo-
bal free trade, APEC liberalization to non-
members, whether carried out individually
32. PPP estimates of per capita incomes are calculated by con-
verting national currencies into dollars based on their relative
purchasing power, rather than on market exchange rates. In
general, the poorer the country, the higher its per capita in-
come in dollars estimated by the former, compared with the
latter, conversion method.
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or cooperatively, should be on an uncondi-
tional basis.
4. The voluntary approach to reducing im-
pediments to trade and investment adopted at
Osaka has been called the “Asian way” of
liberalization. Although it confirms the Bogor
goals of free and open trade and investment
by 2010 for developed countries and 2020 for
developing countries, it permits APEC mem-
bers to move at their own pace. Is this ap-
proach likely to prove successful? Should an-
other effort be made to establish agreed
schedules and timetables?
Although we would prefer that APEC ar-
ticulate a clear plan and schedule for reaching
the agreed targets, Osaka revealed little sup-
port among Asian countries for what many
regard as the legalistic “Anglo-Saxon” ap-
proach. Moreover, they have pointed to the
large-scale unilateral reduction of tariffs and
nontariff barriers in the area as evidence of the
efficacy of the voluntary approach. The United
States should, therefore, accept the looser
“Asian way” of allowing each country to pro-
ceed toward the free trade goal at its own
pace. However, in order to exert pressure for
advancing toward free trade, the United
States should propose that APEC develop a
common yardstick for gauging progress and
publish annual reviews evaluating measures
taken by individual countries to meet the
agreed targets.
5. What should be the future U.S. role in
APEC? Without fast-track authority, the
United States was unable to take the lead at
Osaka or to match other countries’ down pay-
ments on trade liberalization. However, act-
ing under authority left over from the Uruguay
Round negotiations, President Clinton was
able, at the 1996 Summit in the Philippines, to
persuade the heads of state to issue a state-
ment calling for negotiation of an information
technology agreement in the WTO.  This U.S.
initiative was unquestionably the major
achievement of the 1996 APEC Summit.
Realistically, there is no alternative to U.S.
leadership in an organization dedicated to
the goal of free and open trade and invest-
ment. No other large APEC country has dem-
onstrated a strong commitment to these prin-
ciples and a willingness and capacity to step
out front and take the lead.
However, the U.S. role as leader must be
different from what it was after World War
II, when the U.S. economy virtually domi-
nated the world. At that time, the three pil-
lars of the present global economic system
(GATT, IMF, and the World Bank) were con-
ceived and established at U.S. initiative. With
the present wider diffusion of wealth and
economic power and heightened national
sensibilities, particularly in the developing
world, America’s new role both globally and
in APEC must be that of rallier of nations:
The United States must project a coherent
strategy to advance the common interest and
inspire and induce collective action by its
own example and by patient consultation
with its principal trading partners in both
the industrial and the developing worlds.
 EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC CAUCUS
The East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC)
is an initiative of Prime Minister Mahatir of
Malaysia, who has long sought a role for Asia
in world affairs independent of Western in-
fluence. The organization would be composed
of the nine ASEAN countries plus Japan, South
Korea, and China; but it would exclude the
United States, Australia, and other non-Asian
members of APEC. Although the purposes of
the group have not been spelled out with clar-
ity, the intention appears to be to create an
East Asian bargaining unit as a counterweight
to the European Union and the projected West-
ern Hemisphere Free Trade Area, of which
NAFTA would be the nucleus.
Japan was initially wary of the Mahatir
initiative, but both Japan and China have
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expressed some support for it. Even Keidanren,
the influential Japanese business organization,
disclosed at one point that it was actively con-
sidering endorsement of Japanese participa-
tion. According to Keidanren staff, the reason
was that “Japanese business executives have
become fed up with constant U.S. trade com-
plaints and see little reason to offend an Asian
leader who wants to establish a regional dia-
logue.”33 Another reason for the appeal of
EAEC is the common view in Asia that NAFTA
and its likely enlargement signify a primary
U.S. commitment to the Western Hemisphere
rather than to Asia.
We share the concerns already expressed
by the U.S. and Australian governments
about EAEC’s exclusivity and its likely ef-
fect in contributing to the very three-bloc
world that most APEC participants are try-
ing to avoid. Moreover, EAEC would sepa-
rate the two prime players in APEC—the
United States and Japan—whose bilateral
economic ties have a profound effect on the
regional economy.
U.S.-JAPAN BILATERAL TRADE
ISSUES
The most contentious bilateral issue be-
tween individual APEC members has been
the U.S. trade relationship with Japan. The
nature of the strains in that relationship has
been clearly laid out, from a private-sector
viewpoint, in successive CED-Keizai Doyukai
joint policy statements. At the government
level, the issue has been a major preoccupa-
tion of both the previous and present U.S.
administrations. They have carried on a series
of often acrimonious bilateral meetings with
the Japanese under the aegis first of the Struc-
tural Impediments Initiative (SII) and then of
the Framework Agreement. The controversy
over Japanese imports of autos and auto parts
was just the most recent example of bitter
conflict between the two countries. At times,
the bilateral economic disputes have provoked
mutual recriminations that have threatened to
sour the vital overall political-security alliance
between the two countries.
We believe the time has come to back off
from the special bilateral U.S. pressure and
threats of sanctions on Japan and to rely in-
creasingly on the strengthened multilateral
dispute-settlement facility established in the
WTO on issues that lie within its jurisdic-
tion.
Since the facility began operations in Janu-
ary 1995, it has worked well and much to the
benefit of the United States. Of the 128 mem-
ber countries of the WTO, the United States
has been the major user of the dispute-settle-
ment process and for the most part has pre-
vailed in the cases it has brought on behalf of
American exporters. Recently, a U.S. complaint
about unfair Japanese taxes on liquor was de-
cided against Japan, opening the way for
American liquor exporters to sell their prod-
ucts at lower prices in Japan. Still pending is
the important U.S. complaint filed in June 1996
in the controversy between Eastman Kodak
and Fuji Photo over market access for film in
Japan. A ruling in this case could help to clarify
the issues relating to private restrictive prac-
tices in the distribution sector.
Many of the bilateral controversies between
the United States and Japan would clearly fall
within the competence of the WTO dispute-
settlement facility because they relate to mat-
ters specifically covered in GATT. Other is-
sues, such as foreign investment restrictions
and the private collusive practices of Japanese
firms that impair market access, are not now
explicitly addressed in GATT, although pre-
paratory work toward including competition
policy is under way in the WTO Secretariat.
Until WTO rules are established on these
subjects, disputes will continue to require
bilateral solutions.
Another justification for shifting the em-
phasis in U.S. disputes with Japan from the
special bilateral approach to the multilateral
33. Paul Blustein, “‘Just Say No’ to Those Western Allies,” The
Washington Post, ll December 1994.
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framework is the change in the Japanese
economic position relative to the rest of the
countries in the Asia-Pacific area. As shown in
Figure 6, Japan’s share of world income is
projected (under the medium projections) to
decline by the year 2003, while the shares of
China and the rest of Asia-Pacific are expected
to increase substantially. These trends reflect
what appears to be a permanent slowdown in
the long-term growth rate of Japan, while
China and the rest of the region are likely to
maintain their exceptionally high real growth
over the coming decade.
The trends in GDP growth rates underlie
the related decline in the importance of Japan
as a U.S. trading partner compared with that
of the other countries of the region. Figure 7
shows that U.S. trade with China and the rest
of the Asia-Pacific region already substantially
exceeds U.S. trade with Japan. Moreover, the
share of U.S. merchandise trade with Japan is
estimated (again using the medium projec-
tion) to decline by 10 percent over the 1993-
2003 decade, while the trade share of China
and the rest of the region is projected to in-
crease by about 20 percent.
Attitudes in some parts of the U.S. busi-
ness community appear to reflect these trends.
Figure 7
Figure 6
World Income Shares, 1993 to 2003
(percent)
1993                               2003
Low      Medium High
North America 26.3 22.8 24.0 25.5
United States 21.9 18.2 19.2 20.6
Canada 2.1 1.9   2.0 2.0
Mexico 2.3 2.7  2.8 2.9
Asia-Pacific region 26.1 28.1 31.0 33.6
Japan 8.8 7.6 8.1 8.8
China 8.8 10.8 13.0 15.5
Rest of Asia-
Pacific region 8.5 8.4 9.9 10.8
Korea 1.5 1.4 1.9 2.1
Taiwan 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.3
Hong Kong 0.6 0.5  0.7 0.8
Singapore 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5
Malaysia 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
Thailand 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.4
Philippines 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5
Indonesia 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.4
Australia 2.2 1.9 2.0 2.1
New Zealand 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Western Europe 22.5 18.3 19.1 19.9
Latin America 6.0 5.6 5.9 6.1
Rest of the world 19.1 19.2 20.0 21.9
NOTE: Shares are calculated from purchasing-power-adjusted
national income figures.
SOURCE:  Marcus Noland, Implications of Asian Economic
Growth (Washington, D.C.: Working Paper Series, no. 94-5,
Institute for International Economics, 1995).
1993                            2003
Low Medium High
North America 28.3 27.5 30.3 31.5
Canada 20.5 16.5 18.2 19.2
Mexico 7.8 10.8 12.1 12.5
Asia-Pacific region 35.2 34.7 37.6 41.1
Japan 14.7 12.2 13.2 15.0
China 3.8 4.2 5.3 6.7
Rest of Asia-
Pacific region 16.6 16.4 19.1 21.6
Korea 3.0 2.5 3.4 4.1
Taiwan 3.9 3.7 4.5 5.3
Hong Kong 1.9 1.6 2.1 2.6
Singapore 2.3 2.3 2.6 3.0
Malaysia 1.6 1.8 2.1 2.4
Thailand 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.9
Philippines 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0
Indonesia 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.1
Australia 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.1
New Zealand 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Western Europe 22.2 17.4 18.5 20.2
Latin America 6.8 5.9 6.3 7.0
Rest of the world 7.5 6.9 7.3 8.1
U.S. Trade Shares, 1993 to 2003
(percent)
NOTE: The data are for U.S. merchandise exports and imports
combined.
SOURCE: Noland, Implications of Asian Economic Growth.
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Although Japan remains by far the largest
single market in Asia for many U.S. firms, a
New York Times report from Tokyo states:
“More and more, American companies seem
to be less mindful of Japan, lured instead by
faster growing, less-developed markets in
China and elsewhere in Asia. Japan is per-
ceived as an already mature market in which
it is expensive to operate, with strong domes-
tic competitors and numerous regulations and
other barriers.”34
Although the bilateral approach to trade
issues with Asian countries has often been
acrimonious, it has led to important steps in
opening markets. In the case of Japan, for ex-
ample, liberalization agreements have been
reached in a number of sectors including con-
struction, plate glass, medical equipment, tele-
communications, cellular phones, and most
recently, the primary insurance market, which
covers mainly life, auto, fire, and other casu-
alty insurance. The bilateral approach has also
been effective in improving intellectual prop-
erty protection and market access in a number
of other Asian countries. In favoring greater
reliance on the WTO dispute-settlement fa-
cilities for issues covered in agreements ad-
ministered by the WTO, we do not mean to
preclude initial efforts to resolve such dis-
putes through bilateral consultation and di-
plomacy. However, threats of sanctions or
other punitive action should be avoided in
favor of recourse to the WTO.* **
CHINA IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
China’s economic achievement over the
past 15 years has been stunning. Since 1980, its
GDP has grown at an average annual rate of
8.2 percent, a pace matched by only one other
country in the world, South Korea. China’s
trade has been expanding even more rapidly
than its GDP, doubling every seven years and
more than quadrupling over the period since
1980. Over 80 percent of its exports are manu-
factured products. And it is also on the way to
becoming one of the world’s largest markets
for imports (see Figure 8).
At the same time, foreign investment has
been pouring into China. In 1996, China
received $52 billion of private capital flows,
by far the largest inflow into any country in
the developing world. Of this amount, 81 per-
cent was in the form of foreign direct invest-
ment35 (see Figure 9).
As a major player in the global economy,
China wants very much to become a member
of the WTO. Membership in the WTO would
recognize China’s “rightful” place in the glo-
bal economic system, would consolidate and
grant respectability to its emerging presence
in international markets, and would provide a
legal guarantee that other countries would
not discriminate against its exports.
However, China’s behavior with respect to
trade and foreign investment raises questions
about the country’s readiness to join an orga-
nization based on the principles of mutual
liberalization, nondiscrimination, and respect
for intellectual property rights (IPRs). China
blocks some imports with layers of testing
requirements and licensing procedures that
serve only protectionist purposes. Many rules
and subsidies vary from province to province
and are too opaque to allow outside examina-
tion to determine whether they are in confor-
mity with the obligations of WTO member-
ship.
In defense of these protectionist policies,
the Chinese point to the still- functioning state-
owned sectors, where production is highly
inefficient by international standards. With-
out protection, they argue, these industries
would require even larger direct state subsi-
34.  Andrew Pollack, “U.S. Is Shifting Trade Emphasis Away
from Japan: Companies Are Driving the Policy,” The New York
Times, 4 November 1994, p. D-1.
35.  World Bank, Global Development Finance 1997, vol. 1 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997), pp. 7, 29. The largest single
source of foreign direct investment for China over the period
from 1986 to 1992 was Hong Kong (71 percent). Next was
Japan, with 10 percent, followed by the United States, with 8
percent. Riedel, “Capital Market Integration in Developing
Asia.”
*See memorandum by HARRY L. FREEMAN, (page 37).
**See memorandum by MARTIN B. ZIMMERMAN,
(page 38).
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dies than they now receive in order to survive,
or else millions of Chinese workers would be
rendered unemployed. Any abrupt moves to
liberalize trade in these sectors would desta-
bilize the Chinese economy and society. The
West should therefore be tolerant of China’s
strong preference for a gradual approach to
trade liberalization.
China’s policies have been especially weak
regarding IPRs. It has pirated as much as $l
billion annually of intellectual property in the
form of pharmaceuticals, computer programs,
music recordings, films, and books that have
been copied and sold at home and abroad
without compensation to foreign holders of
patents, copyrights, and trademarks. In Feb-
ruary 1995, the United States reached an agree-
ment with China for the protection of IPRs,
but its enforcement has not been effective.
Chinese factories continued to produce mil-
lions of illegal copies of American films and
software, prompting the United States to
threaten sanctions again. Although China
Figure 8
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claims that substantial progress is being made,
it remains to be seen how effective the new
agreement reached in 1996 will be in reduc-
ing piracy and strengthening enforcement of
IPRs.
China has also been restrictive with respect
to foreign investment. For example, American
and other foreign auto companies have been
told they must start making parts in China
before being considered for permission to build
an assembly plant. The government further
insists that China retain majority control of
any assembly plant regardless of the amount
each party contributes to a joint venture. In
addition, state enterprises have defaulted on
their loan obligations to a number of foreign
banks.36
As one of the world’s ten largest export-
ers, China belongs in the WTO. The ques-
tion is: Under what conditions?
It would be unwise for the United States
to yield to domestic pressure to link Chinese
accession to noncommercial considerations.
However important we regard human rights,
workers’ rights, weapons proliferation, and
China’s policy toward Hong Kong, such link-
age is deeply resented by China, would not be
supported by other major members of the
WTO, and is unlikely to be effective.  China
has told Washington that the talks on acces-
sion should not be used as a “dirty-laundry
hamper” filled with other issues.37
A major objective of U.S. economic policy
toward China should be to ensure that China
plays by the rules of the international trad-
ing system. However, there are some in China
who see the rules as stacked in favor of the
interests of richer and more powerful coun-
tries and against the poorer and weaker ones
and who, in any case, question why China
should follow any rules it did not participate
in writing. Moreover, they note that China
already receives de facto from all countries the
single most important benefit that member-
ship in the WTO has to offer: MFN status.
Given these attitudes and the reality of
China’s current trade practices, it is prudent
to require that as a condition for accession,
China show its good faith by adopting
elementary fair trade and investment prac-
tices domestically. As a minimum, it should
be required to ensure effective protection
of intellectual property rights, get rid of
domestic-content requirements imposed on
foreign investors, and make its laws and regu-
lations transparent so that foreign govern-
ments and the WTO can monitor the degree
of China’s conformity to the rules. With these
basic reforms in place, the United States
should support China’s accession, including
a reasonable, specific phase-in period for
complying with the WTO rules and liberal-
ization commitments.38
AGRICULTURE
Three trends—population growth, income
increases, and urbanization—will drive the
food and agricultural systems of the Asia-
Pacific region well into the next century. Total
consumption will grow, but a dramatic change
in dietary patterns will be more important. At
low income levels, per capita grain consump-
36. “Honeymoon’s Over: After the Initial Ardor, China and
Foreigners Argue about Money,” Wall Street Journal, 2 Decem-
ber 1994.
37. Robert S. Greenberger, “China’s Drive for Membership in
WTO Divides Amenable Clinton and Congressman Bereuter
on ‘Linkage,’ ” Wall Street Journal, 16 December 1996, p. A-18.
38. However, China’s accession to the WTO would not result in
the automatic granting by the United States of permanent MFN
treatment to its trade with China. Under the Trade Act of 1974
(Title IV), MFN treatment is denied to communist countries
unless the President invokes a waiver permitting him to grant
MFN treatment for a 12-month period. However, the waiver
can be revoked by a joint resolution of Congress. Unless Title IV
is amended or repealed, the United States would be obliged to
opt out from applying the provisions of GATT to China, which
it can do under Article XIII of the WTO charter entitled “Non-
Application of Multilateral Trade Agreements between Par-
ticular Members.” A bill has been introduced in the House of
Representatives by Congressmen Bereuter and Ewing that
would amend Title IV by authorizing the President to extend
permanent MFN status to China under certain conditions. How-
ever, early enactment of the bill is unlikely.
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tion rises steeply as incomes increase. At
middle income levels, consumption of meat,
sweeteners, and vegetable oils accelerates,
which increases the resources required to meet
per capita food demand. Urbanization further
intensifies the use of resources through
stepped-up requirements for transportation,
handling, processing, packaging, and prepa-
ration.
By and large, the land resources to serve
Asia’s rapidly rising food demand lie else-
where. Much of that land is in North America,
where food demand should increase only 20
percent over the next 30 years, compared to
100 percent in East Asia and 150 percent in
South Asia. These trends imply that interna-
tional trade will have to play a key role in
satisfying Asia’s food needs in the years ahead.
Unfortunately, agricultural trade liberaliza-
tion in Asia has not kept up with the reduc-
tion of trade barriers that has occurred in the
manufacturing sector. Levels of protection in
agriculture range from 3 percent of farm out-
put value in New Zealand to 75 percent in
Japan. Intercommodity distortions also vary
greatly, from low protection on some com-
modities to prohibitive restrictions on others.
Processing activities are especially subject to
steep effective protection, with duties higher
as the commodity moves up the processing
chain.
Prerequisite to the liberalization of agricul-
tural trade is the reform of domestic agricul-
ture, involving the alignment of domestic with
world prices. Any support to domestic pro-
ducers should take forms that do not distort
production or marketing patterns.
Changes in national investment policies are
also required. Most Asian countries must build
a whole new infrastructure for delivering farm
inputs, handling and processing farm outputs,
and delivering foodstuffs. This needs to be
done in line with global comparative advan-
tage in order to avoid the huge costs of pro-
tecting or writing off uneconomic investments.
Restrictions on inflows of foreign know-how
and capital should be lifted so that they can
contribute fully to building the infrastructure
system as quickly and efficiently as required.
Finally, exporters must guarantee food-im-
porting countries security of supplies. Access
to food should be provided on the same basis
as for domestic customers. Political sanctions
or short-supply controls should be ended.
In sum, we recommend an open global
food system requiring initiatives on four
fronts: domestic farm policy reform; national
investment policy changes; trade and invest-
ment liberalization; and assured access to
supplies for food deficient countries.
PRODUCT STANDARDS
Differences in national product standards
and testing procedures are widespread in the
Asia-Pacific region, constituting barriers to in-
ternational trade and investment. Costs rise as
businesses have to adjust their product runs
to the special requirements of individual
economies. This problem is well recognized in
the United States and the European Union,
and a transatlantic accord was concluded in
1997 to deal with it. We are pleased to note
that APEC has established a subcommittee
which has started to work on this issue.
Some differences in standards are justified
because of variations in climatic, environmen-
tal, or other domestic conditions. However,
the adverse international economic effects
of legitimate differences can be reduced
through a policy of mutual recognition of
national standards and certification and test-
ing procedures, provided certain minimum
requirements are met. Harmonization and
mutual recognition have been recommended
for APEC by both the Eminent Persons Group
and the Pacific Business Forum.
However, standards are sometimes
adopted as covert barriers to trade where more
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traditional restrictions in the form of tariffs
and quotas are ruled out by international com-
mitments or are otherwise not feasible. This
problem can be mitigated by requiring full
transparency and an authoritative scientific
basis for standards.
RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS
PRACTICES
One of the topics proposed by the Eminent
Persons Group for discussion at the Novem-
ber 1994 APEC meeting in Indonesia was
anticompetitive practices in the private sector.
However, the subject was not referred to
either in the Joint Ministerial Statement or the
Leaders’ Declaration issued at the conclusion
of the meeting.
Restrictive business practices have been an
important element in some of the bilateral dis-
putes in the region, especially between the
United States and Japan. However, national
policies on competition vary widely:  Some
members of APEC have elaborate antitrust
policies; others have no laws in this field or
are just beginning to develop them. More-
over, the extent of enforcement of existing
legislation differs greatly among countries of
the region.
Because anticompetitive practices in the
private sector can undermine trade agreements
to foster fair competition, an open world trad-
ing system would function more effectively if
private restrictive practices could be pre-
vented. It is for this reason that the subject has
been placed on the post-Uruguay Round
GATT agenda. Active preparations for nego-
tiating a global competition code are already
under way in the WTO.
Progress in addressing anticompetitive
practices on the global front is bound to be
slow. It can be accelerated by efforts at the
APEC level to strengthen and harmonize na-
tional competition policy. A first step would
be to gather information on national policies
and assess their effects on the flow of trade
and investment.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
Vast new investments in public infrastruc-
ture are required in the Asia-Pacific area. The
region’s rapid industrialization has outpaced
the capacity of existing facilities, including
power, water, roads, harbors, and telecom-
munications. Unless massive improvements
are undertaken, rapid economic growth will
not be sustainable.
Most infrastructure projects are undertaken
by public authorities. Financial issues relating
to the sources of capital for those investments
are addressed on pages 5-14. Here we focus
on the extent to which public procurement in
Asia-Pacific is carried out on the basis of com-
petitive principles.
Unfortunately, much public procurement
in the area is not open to true competitive
bidding. Even where laws and regulations pre-
scribe transparency and competition, obstacles
to granting contracts to foreign firms are wide-
spread. The devices used cover a wide spec-
trum that includes arbitrary standards, biased
certification procedures, and specifications tai-
lored to the qualifications of local firms.
Only two Asian countries, Japan and
Korea, are signatories of the new Agreement
on Government Procurement concluded in the
GATT Uruguay Round. The Uruguay Agree-
ment provides that every step of a national
tendering process be governed by the prin-
ciples of national treatment, nondiscrimina-
tion, and transparency.
However, the Uruguay Agreement also
expands the coverage of the Tokyo Code by
including services and construction as well as
some coverage of subcentral governments and
government-owned utilities. It tightens Code
discipline by requiring a bid-challenge proce-
dure that for the first time grants foreign firms
direct access to enforcement procedures un-
der the regulations of the importing country.
The United States should attempt to per-
suade Asian countries, other than Japan and
Korea, to sign the new GATT Agreement on
Public Procurement and to bring their prac-
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tices into conformity with it. To do so would
benefit both purchaser and supplier. It would
mean lower costs for Asian infrastructure and
export opportunities for foreign firms.
Competition in procurement can also be
distorted because of government subsidies to
particular firms or domestic industries, such
as the aircraft industry. Such practices can be
constrained by applying the subsidy disci-
plines of the Uruguay Round agreement to
which all WTO members have subscribed.
A present reality is the aggressive promo-
tion of foreign sales of domestic products by
senior officials of the major industrial coun-
tries. Typically, the products involved are big-
ticket items of capital equipment, such as
power-generation and telecommunications
products, aircraft, and supercomputers. The
customer is often a foreign government in
which critical decisions occur at key points of
influence, access to which may require the
intervention and support of high-ranking
officials of the foreign exporter’s government.
In order to ensure a more level playing field
for U.S. suppliers, senior officials of the U.S.
government should lend their support for
major foreign sales of U.S. products, espe-
cially when the customer is a foreign gov-
ernment.*
LABOR STANDARDS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
There have been growing calls in the United
States and some European countries for link-
ing access to markets with the acceptance and
observance of certain international labor stan-
dards, such as the prohibition of child labor
and the protection of workers’ rights to orga-
nize and bargain collectively. GATT permits
import restrictions on products made with
prison labor (Article XXe) but otherwise does
not allow the use of trade sanctions as a means
of improving labor conditions.
In Europe, labor standards are commonly
discussed under the “social clause” or “social
charter.” In the United States the issue arose
in the context of the negotiations on NAFTA.
It was addressed, along with environmental
standards, in side agreements that proved nec-
essary for Congressional approval of NAFTA.
However, NAFTA simply calls for each coun-
try to be diligent in enforcing its own stan-
dards, rather than requiring adherence to com-
monly agreed international standards. In
practice, U.S. firms typically adhere to higher
labor standards than those mandated by the
local law of countries in which they operate.
The rationale for linking trade liberaliza-
tion and labor standards is twofold: to help
improve the lot of the poor and vulnerable
abroad and to prevent competition from coun-
tries with poor working conditions from un-
dermining the position of labor at home.
Asian countries, as well as other nations in
the developing world, have generally opposed
linking trade and labor standards. They have
argued that the best approach to improving
labor standards is, not to try to push them up
through legislation, but to pull them up
through economic growth. Taiwan and Korea
are cited as examples. In Taiwan, real wages
are eight times higher than they were a gen-
eration ago; and in Korea, they are more than
six times higher.39
CED believes that there is merit in the
Asian position. Moreover, if labor standards
are included in trade agreements, they could
easily become protectionist devices for re-
stricting imports from low-wage countries
on the grounds of “unfairness.”
We therefore concur in the principle in-
cluded in the declaration of the 1996 WTO
ministerial meeting in Singapore that the
preferable way to deal with this issue is
through the International Labor Organiza-
tion (ILO). The ILO has a long record of
work for the improvement of labor standards
in which national differences in levels of
economic development are taken into
account.
39. OECD Letter, vol. 3, no. 10, December 1994, p. 5.
*See memorandum by RODERICK M. HILLS, (page 38).
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CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES
ENVIRONMENT
Any Western traveler in the rapidly devel-
oping countries of the Asia-Pacific region is
struck by the extreme degree of air pollution
in major cities such as Bangkok and Jakarta.
More generally, environmental degradation
in the form of air, water, and soil pollution has
grown at an accelerating rate. At the same
time, the rising standards of living associated
with economic growth have increased both
the demand for environmental improvement
and the capacity to allocate economic and tech-
nological resources to coping with the prob-
lems. Today, there is wide recognition of the
need to balance growth with preserving the
environment; nearly $50 billion is spent each
year on pollution control in Asia.
National action to clean up the environ-
ment should be facilitated by policies
adopted at the regional level. For example, in
its report for the Bogor meeting of APEC, the
EPG called for international agreement on in-
ternalizing environmental protection costs and
recommended that APEC advance that objec-
tive by endorsing the “polluter pays” prin-
ciple. The EPG report also proposed the shar-
ing of environmental technologies and joint
funding of environmentally sound develop-
ment projects, with the costs of controlling
cross-border pollution borne by APEC mem-
bers on the basis of ability to pay. In addition,
it endorsed the development of common meth-
odologies of risk analysis and the exchange of
scientific data and analyses.40
Ultimately, environmental standards and
actions will reflect national priorities and eco-
nomic capacities and will therefore have to be
dealt with by individual countries. However,
all governments should educate their citi-
zens about the importance of environmental
preservation and should encourage improved
practices in the private sector. Foreign direct
investors can lead the way in this regard be-
cause they usually ratchet up environmental
standards in their own operations.
The relation between trade and environ-
ment policies is high on the global agenda of
the WTO. One of the questions to be addressed
is the implications for competitiveness of varia-
tions among countries in environmental pro-
duction standards. Do low standards provide
an unfair advantage in international trade and
investment, and should restrictive action there-
fore be permitted against countries with the
lower standards? It is precisely this possibility
of trade sanctions that has made many devel-
oping countries suspicious of any attempts to
deal with the environmental problem in the
WTO or, more generally, in the context of
international trade issues.
In our view, APEC can play a bellwether
role in the WTO by addressing these issues
in the regional context in advance of their
being taken up in the global body. In par-
40. Eminent Persons Group, Achieving the APEC Vision,
Second Report (Singapore: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation,
August 1994).
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ticular, APEC is an appropriate forum for
designing protections against the application
of trade sanctions against developing coun-
tries with lower environmental standards.
A related issue concerns transborder envi-
ronmental spillovers and the effects of domes-
tic economic activity on the global commons
such as the ozone layer. Some internationally
negotiated agreements on these matters incor-
porate trade restrictions as ultimate enforce-
ment mechanisms. Safeguards should be
established in the form of access to interna-
tional dispute-settlement facilities such as
the WTO in cases where trade sanctions are
used to enforce international environmental
agreements.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
AND THE PROTECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Technology is transferred among countries
through a variety of channels. One is simply
international trade, through which develop-
ing countries acquire products embodying
advanced technology and through which the
population at large becomes exposed to new
technological accomplishments and possibili-
ties. This channel should be greatly facilitated
by the Information Technology Agreement
initiated at the Subic Bay APEC Summit in
November 1996 and negotiated the following
month at the first ministerial meeting of the
WTO in Singapore. The Agreement requires
the phaseout of tariffs by the year 2000 in a
wide range of information technology prod-
ucts, including computers and software.
Another channel is the cross-border educa-
tion of students in science and engineering.
According to a recent report of the Institute of
International Education, about 450,000 foreign
students are enrolled in American universi-
ties, and well over half of these students come
from Asian countries. About 40 percent of the
foreign students are enrolled in science and
engineering programs.41
A third vehicle for technology transfer is
joint research and development by individu-
als and companies of different nationalities.
For example, DuPont and IBM have laborato-
ries in Japan, and AT&T has teamed up with a
Korean firm, Goldstar Semiconductor, to man-
ufacture public telephone exchanges and local
area networks.
Finally, the bulk of technological transfer
occurs through the operations of multinational
firms, both by the production activities of their
foreign affiliates and their contractual arrange-
ments to license technology and provide ser-
vices to unaffiliated companies. In fact, the
transfer of knowledge rather than of financial
capital should be regarded as the essence of
FDI because a substantial part of capital is
typically raised by multinational enterprises
in the countries in which they operate. In-
deed, in a number of developing countries,
the prime consideration in permitting a for-
eign firm to establish an affiliate is its techno-
logical rather than its financial contribution.
The globalization of the market for tech-
nology has underlined the importance of
worldwide legal protection for invention and
innovation. In a number of Asian countries,
however, the most innovative American com-
panies have often been the victims of piracy
and counterfeiting that have deprived them of
much of the fruits of their investment and
effort. Although piracy of intellectual prop-
erty is still widespread in China, progress is
being made in enforcing IPRs there.42  Nations
lacking effective protection for intellectual
property, such as India, are beginning to real-
ize that they themselves have been adversely
affected by the resulting damper on inward
foreign investment and on the development
of their own innovations.*
41. “Foreign Students: Who They Are,” New York Times, 4
January 1995, p. A-17, based on data from the Institute of
International Education.
42. Statement of Robert Holleyman, President of the Business
Software Alliance at Pacific Leaders Forum, Seattle, October l,
1996.
*See memorandum by JOHN DIEBOLD, (page 38).
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To deal with this problem, the GATT
Uruguay Round addressed the issue of the
protection of IPRs. The final agreement estab-
lishes higher standards for the protection of a
full range of IPRs and provides for the en-
forcement of those standards both internally
and at the border. Included are patents, copy-
rights, trademarks, industrial designs, trade
secrets, and integrated circuits.
In order to enlist the concurrence of the
developing countries, the GATT Intellectual
Property Agreement had to provide for tran-
sition periods of 5 to 11 years for the applica-
tion of its provisions to them. Because piracy
and counterfeiting are still widespread in
Asia, the U.S. government should continue
its efforts to improve the protection of intel-
lectual property in the region, including a
reduction of the phase-in period for conform-
ing to the GATT rules and application to
property in the development pipeline in sec-
tors such as pharmaceuticals.
A related problem is how to protect the
security of proprietary information in light of
dramatic ongoing innovations in communica-
tions technology. With advances in telecom-
munications such as the Internet and on-line
services, borders are disappearing. At the same
time, the ability to inflict viruses or to create
other kinds of malfunctions in the so-called
information superhighway can be extremely
damaging to international trade and invest-
ment.
The information security issue is on the
agenda of the OECD, which has developed
guidelines to lift curbs on encryption software.
Cooperative arrangements should be estab-
lished between the OECD and APEC as a
means of engaging a wider group of Asian
countries in the task of improving informa-
tion security.
CORRUPTION AND CODES
OF CONDUCT
An issue related to public procurement is
that of bribery and corrupt practices. Bribery
distorts markets and hampers economic per-
formance. It creates a barrier to fair competi-
tion and trade that puts at a disadvantage
companies that refuse to engage in the prac-
tice. Weak governments are further under-
mined by corruption, and emerging democra-
cies are threatened.
Where public procurement is subject to
bureaucratic discretion rather than competi-
tive principles, opportunities for granting fa-
vors and for other forms of corruption prolif-
erate. The incidence of corruption is also
related to the lack of a reliable legal system
(China) and low pay for civil servants (Viet-
nam). Although outright bribes in return for
construction contracts are not uncommon in
Asia, more often the corrupt practice takes a
subtler form, such as putting an official’s son
through college in America.
Some foreign firms play the game on the
principle that “when in Rome, do as the Ro-
mans do.” However, U.S. firms are constrained
by the provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act (FCPA). How serious a competitive
disadvantage does the FCPA pose for U.S.
firms, and what can be done about it?
Based on a report on Asian corruption by a
Hong Kong firm, Political and Economic Risk
Consultancy, The Economist states that “big
firms can usually find ways to avoid corrup-
tion in all but the relatively minor day-to-day
dealings with low-level bureaucrats. Big mul-
tinationals can go right to the top of a minis-
try, and avoid lowly officials trying to line
their pockets. For smaller companies with less
clout, it can be tougher.”43
Whatever the conditions prevailing in a
particular country, the FCPA may be less of a
constraint than is generally believed. The Act
distinguishes bribes, which are prohibited,
from “facilitating payments,” which are per-
mitted. The distinction is not simply euphe-
mistic. Bribes are a payment to induce a for-
eign official to do what he is not supposed to
43. “Hard Graft in Asia,” The Economist, 27 May 1995, p. 61.
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do, whereas a facilitating payment is intended
to induce a foreign official to do expeditiously
what he is supposed to do—for example,
issue routine permits to do business, process
government papers such as visas, or clear
merchandise through customs.
In any case, the Clinton Administration
has been trying on several fronts to level the
playing field. In the OECD, it pushed hard in
1994 for a code on bribery, but the initial
result was a considerably watered-down set
of principles, and implementation was strictly
voluntary. The United States has also been
pressing other OECD countries to criminalize
bribery and, at a minimum, to alter the com-
mon practice of allowing the deduction of
bribes from company tax returns.
Finally, in May 1997, the OECD member
countries agreed to negotiate by the end of
the year a binding international convention
to criminalize bribery of foreign public offi-
cials. They also agreed to put antibribery leg-
islation before their parliaments by April 1998
with a view to having it come into force by
the end of that year. We strongly support the
combination of an OECD convention and a
collective pledge to legislate by specific
deadlines as a promising approach to out-
lawing bribery in international transactions.
The United States should encourage APEC
members who are not also members of the
OECD to sign on to the convention when it
is completed.
On the global front, the United States suc-
ceeded in December 1996 in getting the United
Nations General Assembly to adopt the Dec-
laration against Corruption and Bribery in
International Transactions.  In addition, the
U.S. Trade Representative has suggested that
the issue of “illicit payments” in international
transactions be taken up in the WTO as part
of a new negotiation on competition policies
affecting international trade. We support the
suggestion of the U.S. Trade Representative,
but we recommend that the subject of cor-
rupt practices also be placed on the agenda
of APEC. Because APEC has less than one-
seventh the membership of the WTO, more
rapid progress is likely at that level.
Recently, the Clinton Administration issued
a voluntary set of “Model Business Principles”
as guidelines for U.S. firms in conducting busi-
ness abroad. The principles broadly parallel
the content of codes of conduct that leading
U.S. multinationals, such as Caterpillar, have
long espoused on their own. In addition to the
avoidance of illicit payments, the model prin-
ciples include provisions for a safe and health-
ful workplace, fair employment practices, re-
sponsible environmental protection, and the
maintenance of a corporate culture that re-
spects free expression and does not condone
political coercion in the workplace. The last
item is intended partly to strike a blow for
human rights now that the issue of China’s
human rights record has been severed from
the issue of its MFN status.
The United States should request that
APEC circulate the “Model Business Prin-
ciples” to Asian firms as useful reference
points for framing their own codes of con-
duct.*
HUMAN RIGHTS
Human rights in Asia became a salient
issue in the U.S. debate on extending MFN
treatment to China. That debate highlighted
many of the questions underlying the effort to
influence Asian government policies in a num-
ber of sensitive areas of domestic civil and
political life.
Human rights are generally taken to com-
prehend the right to participate effectively in
the political process, including freedom of ex-
pression, assembly, and association. They also
include protection against physical abuse to
the person as well as arbitrary interference
with property. Some would go further and
include economic and social rights such as
freedom from hunger, the right to education,
and the right to a minimum standard of health
care. However, such rights depend not just on
institutions and practices but also on the avail-
*See memorandum by RODERICK M. HILLS, (page 38).
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ability of resources and therefore are tied to a
nation’s stage of economic development.
A central question in the human rights de-
bate is whether there is any correlation be-
tween the level of economic development and
the protection of civil and political rights. In
Asia, growth has been characterized by a gen-
eral shift to a market economy, including the
gradual relaxation of government intrusion
into and regulation of the private sector and
the liberalization of restrictions on transac-
tions with the rest of the world. All this im-
plies a diffusion of power and decision mak-
ing away from the central authorities, the rise
of a middle class, and inevitable demands for
democratization. Our view is that if economic
growth and prosperity continue, human rights
protection is likely to improve gradually, as
has been the case in Korea and Taiwan.
Another view is that there is a distinctive
“Asian model” of development, epitomized
by Singapore and the pronouncements of its
former long-time Prime Minister, Lee Kuan
Yew. This view stresses efficiency, not democ-
racy, and holds that order and discipline are
more important than freedom. Given the well-
known weaknesses of the “permissive socie-
ties of the West,” this view argues that West-
ern countries should not attempt to impose
their standards on culturally distinct Asian
nations.
If Western countries seek to advance
human rights in Asia, the tools available to
them can range from diplomatic persuasion
and protests to threats or actual imposition of
economic sanctions. Included in the latter are
trade measures, restrictions on private invest-
ment, and the withholding of aid. However,
the rising economic strength of Asia-Pacific
countries has weakened the ability and will-
ingness of industrial countries to use the avail-
able tools effectively. This is particularly true
of Japan and Western Europe, but even the
United States has decided to separate human
rights issues from the granting of MFN treat-
ment for China.
CED believes that in the absence of coop-
eration by other major industrial countries,
economic sanctions would be ineffective in
altering the behavior of a targeted country
and would place U.S. firms in a disadvanta-
geous position. However, the United States
should use diplomatic efforts to stress to
Asian authorities the importance that this
country attaches to progress in the protec-
tion of human rights.
Western economic relations with Asian
countries consist primarily of the activities of
thousands of business firms, rather than of
government-to-government contacts. One way
of enlisting the support of the private busi-
ness sector to advance human rights in Asia
is U.S. government encouragement of the
adoption and dissemination of corporate
codes of conduct. The codes generally in-
clude principles respecting freedom of ex-
pression and opposing political coercion in
the workplace.
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Three overarching developments have
shaped the world economy in the past de-
cade: the triumph of the market over com-
mand-and-control economies, marked by the
end of the Cold War; the rapidly expanding
interaction of countries in world trade and
investment; and unprecedented rates of eco-
nomic growth and structural change in East
Asia and the Pacific.
These three developments are interrelated.
The collapse of the Soviet economy was a ma-
jor cause of the political disintegration of the
country and the end of the Cold War. But it
also induced sweeping economic reforms in
the states of the former Soviet Union and con-
tributed to progress in reform already under
way in much of the developing world. Macro-
economic stability has been pursued, state en-
terprises have been privatized, intrusive do-
mestic government regulations and controls
have been relaxed or lifted, and restrictions on
international trade and capital flows have been
sharply reduced.
Of all the regions of the world, the devel-
oping nations of East Asia have proved to be
the principal beneficiaries of liberalization and
globalization, racking up sustained rates of
growth never experienced in the older indus-
trial economies of Europe and North America.
Because of its size and diversity, China has
dominated the trends in the region, assisted
by substantially open markets for its exports
to the industrial world and by massive in-
flows of foreign investment, far exceeding capi-
tal flows to any other developing country in
East Asia or elsewhere.
The United States shares both political and
economic interests with the Asia-Pacific re-
gion. Our military commitment in the area is
intended, not to dominate other countries, but
to help preserve peace and security in a part
of the world with a history of deep adver-
sarial relations among its major powers, Japan,
China, and Russia. The stabilizing role of the
U.S. military presence is particularly wel-
comed by the smaller countries of the region,
many of which have vivid memories of ag-
gression and occupation by the larger states.
Growing economic interactions between
the United States and Asia-Pacific have
yielded substantial mutual gains. Expanding
trade and foreign investment in response to
market forces entails positive-sum transactions
in which both sides benefit enormously in
terms of greater efficiency in production and
lower prices and wider variety in consump-
tion.
Over time, privatization and the shift to a
market economy also lead to a dispersion of
power in society, the rise of a middle class,
and demands for greater political freedom.
At the same time, the revolution in informa-
tion technology and the large-scale presence
of Asian students in American and other West-
ern universities are spreading knowledge
about the advantages of democratic forms of
government. In the final analysis, increasing
prosperity and exposure to more open societ-
ies generate internal pressures for broader par-
ticipation in the political process that far out-
weigh ad hoc external pressures for the
advancement of human rights.
CONCLUSION:
THE POWER OF
GLOBAL BUSINESS
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44. World Trade Organization, 1995 International Trade: Trends
and Statistics (Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization,
1995), Table A3.
45. World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1996, Volume 1, Table 1.2.
Although domestic policies are critical to
economic growth, the relative openness of the
U.S. market has made a major contribution to
Asia’s economic success. The United States is
by far the largest non-Asian market for Asian
products, exceeding all of Western Europe by
a wide margin. More than 80 percent of Asia’s
exports consist of manufactured products.
Within Asia, trade liberalization is proceed-
ing on three fronts. The first consists of the
unilateral reduction of tariffs and nontariff
barriers as an inherent part of individual coun-
tries’ basic structural reforms. The second is
liberalization moves undertaken or commit-
ted within a regional context such as ASEAN
and APEC. The third is that, with the excep-
tion of China and Taiwan, virtually all Asian
countries are members of the WTO and there-
fore participants in multilateral negotiations
for both the liberalization of trade in goods
and services and the improvement of the
framework of international rules and disci-
plines governing world commerce. As one of
the world’s major economies, China belongs
in the WTO, and we hope that negotiations for
its accession will prove successful.
Some have feared that APEC, with its large
and diverse membership, is likely to under-
mine progress in the WTO. However, APEC is
involved not only in trade liberalization but
also in many aspects of trade and investment
facilitation that are not yet on the WTO’s
active agenda but that are of keen practical
interest to the business community. Moreover,
the Subic Bay Summit demonstrated that
APEC is capable of serving as a spur to action
in the WTO, as in the announcement by the
APEC leaders of their intention to negotiate in
the WTO an agreement for free trade in a wide
range of technology products. Most impor-
tant, APEC has been instrumental in reducing
traditional North-South ideological conflict
and confrontation and bringing together a
highly diverse group of countries on a com-
mon conceptual framework for an open world
economy.
Foreign investment has been a bigger story
in recent years than trade. True, Asian exports
have increased rapidly since 1990, doubling in
the case of China to $121 billion.44 But the
annual flow of foreign private capital to East
Asia has risen at an even steeper pace, in-
creasing fivefold since 1990. In 1995, the flow
reached almost $100 billion, 46 percent of
which went to China.45 More than half of for-
eign private capital flows for East Asia has
been in the form of direct investment, but
substantial flows have also occurred in port-
folio investment in both stocks and bonds as
well as in lending by commercial banks.
International institutions such as the WTO,
the IMF, and the World Bank have contrib-
uted greatly to the expansion of global trade
and investment. By exerting pressure for the
removal of trade and capital restrictions and
for the reform of domestic regulations, they
are helping to create a more integrated global
economy in which the economic significance
of political boundaries is steadily eroding.
However, the key role in the economic as-
cent of the Asia-Pacific nations has been played
by business. In contrast with the steep rise in
private capital flows to the region, official capi-
tal flows have stagnated and now amount to
less than seven percent of the total inflow. The
Asia-Pacific community will be shaped more
by day-to-day business dealings and partner-
ships between local and foreign enterprises
than by government-to-government relations.
Most important, by transcending national
and regional boundaries, global business has
become a powerful force in opposition to
deeply rooted, narrow, and exclusive geo-
graphic nationalism with all its destructive
political and economic potential. Working as
partners—with each other and with govern-
ments and international institutions—far-
sighted business leaders have a vital role to
play in promoting prosperity through freer
and more open markets for trade and capital
in the evolving Asia-Pacific region.
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Page 7, RODERICK M. HILLS
A precursor to the Framework Talks in
addressing U.S.-Japanese saving-investment
imbalances was the Structural Impediments
Initiative, which was undertaken by President
Bush in 1989.
Page 7, RODERICK M. HILLS
The high Japanese saving rate has financed
additional capital formation to raise produc-
tive capacity for the approaching demographic
transition. However, compared with the
United States, Japan has not provided ad-
equate retirement programs to direct the fruits
of this productive capacity to future retirees.
Page 10, HARRY L. FREEMAN, with which
JOHN DIEBOLD has asked to be associated
With regard to financial services negotia-
tions, those are ongoing and the chance of
some kind of acceptable agreement by year
end 1997 looks good at this writing. However,
we need to emphasize that the old phrase “no
deal is better than a lousy deal” may still ap-
ply here. The United States is open and wants
to remain open; if the other countries do not
go in this direction, with commitment, then it
is entirely proper for the United States to re-
consider its openness policy at some level.
Page 10, MARTIN B. ZIMMERMAN, with
which ALAN BELZER has asked to be
associated
Regarding CED’s recommendation on
financial services, as the WTO Financial Ser-
MEMORANDA OF COMMENT, RESERVATION, OR DISSENT
vices negotiations resume, now is not the time
for Treasury negotiators to take the threat of
withholding MFN treatment off the table, as
recommended. There is no more evidence that
in this round of negotiations, developing coun-
tries will make sufficient market liberalization
offers than they did in previous rounds.
Page 13, RODERICK M. HILLS, with which
JOHN DIEBOLD has asked to be associated
I disagree with the recommendation to
expand the IMF emergency fund. A larger
fund is more likely to encourage irresponsible
behavior than to cure it.
Page 24, HARRY L. FREEMAN, with which
JOHN DIEBOLD has asked to be associated
One of the problems in skillfully drafting a
document such as U.S. Economic Policy Toward
the Asia-Pacific Region, and this document is
skillfully drafted, is that events frequently
overtake drafting. In discussing U.S. trade
policy toward Japan, the statement talks of
increased U.S. use of the WTO dispute settle-
ment mechanisms. The United States now has
around 30 cases brought where it is the com-
plaining country, about one-third of the total
complaints in the process. The United States
has adopted a “liberalization by litigation”
strategy which, thus far, has worked very well
in decreasing bilateral confrontation outside
of the WTO framework.
I would advocate a stronger tone towards
eliminating Japanese trade restrictions, which
still form very substantial barriers to U.S. and
other exports.
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Page 24, MARTIN B. ZIMMERMAN, with
which ALAN BELZER has asked to be
associated
Regarding CED’s recommendation on U.S.
negotiating tactics and use of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) to resolve trade issues,
the WTO should be the multilateral venue of
choice to resolve international trade issues,
but it is far too early for the United States to
adopt a policy to withhold using its own trade
laws to resolve bilateral issues, as recom-
mended. The WTO dispute settlement mecha-
nism is new and while promising, is still being
tested. In the auto industry, for example,
Indonesia is the first strong case to emerge,
with a settlement appearing to be imminent.
Nevertheless, all dispute settlement options
need to be available to deal with the many
trade restrictive measures that have not been
handled well in the GATT framework, such as
restrictive distribution or discriminatory regu-
lation. Also, it is unwise to let Japan “off the
hook” bilaterally, as recommended, since
many Asian countries – witness South Korea –
are following similar restrictive policies as
Japan. The U.S. government should serve as a
rallier of nations, but this should be accom-
plished by promoting a policy where the U.S.
government continues to use all its available
resources to open markets.
Page 29, RODERICK M. HILLS
Certainly the U.S. government should in-
tervene to create a level playing field for U.S.-
based businesses. However, I disagree with
the recommendation that senior officials of
the U.S. government should become “sales-
men” for U.S. business. That mercantilist
attitude is not consistent with a free trade
environment.
Page 31, JOHN DIEBOLD
Considering the long and fruitful history
of scientific and technological innovation in
China–ample to fuel forty years of research by
the Needham Institute at Cambridge Univer-
sity–some benefit might accrue in enforcement
of current Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
rules by emphasizing the likely growth in
direct economic interest on the part of coun-
tries such as China in the building of their
own IPR positions. That is, as long as they
don’t start asking for royalties on paper, gun-
powder, ship rudders, the magnetic compass,
or the escapement mechanism of clocks!
After all, with over a million programmers
already in training, it is hard to believe that
China will not shortly be a major originator of
software.
Page 33, RODERICK M. HILLS, with which
JOHN DIEBOLD has asked to be associated
I agree that corrupt practices be on the
agenda of APEC, but I do not believe that
trade talks should be the focus of corrupt prac-
tices. Nor do I believe that President Clinton’s
set of “Model Business Principles” should be
endorsed by CED. There are many models of
corporate conduct codes. We can endorse the
principle without suggesting that the drafting
of such codes is a function of the central
government.
39
For more than 50 years, the Committee for
Economic Development has been a respected
influence on the formation of business and
public policy. CED is devoted to these two
objectives:
To develop, through objective research and
informed discussion, findings and recommenda-
tions for private and public policy that will con-
tribute to preserving and strengthening our free
society, achieving steady economic growth at high
employment and reasonably stable prices, increas-
ing productivity and living standards, providing
greater and more equal opportunity for every
citizen, and improving the quality of life for all.
To bring about increasing understanding by
present and future leaders in business, govern-
ment, and education, and among concerned
citizens, of the importance of these objectives and
the ways in which they can be achieved.
CED’s work is supported by private volun-
tary contributions from business and
industry, foundations, and individuals. It is
independent, nonprofit, nonpartisan, and non-
political.
Through this business-academic partner-
ship, CED endeavors to develop policy state-
ments and other research materials that
commend themselves as guides to public and
business policy; that can be used as texts in
college economics and political science courses
and in management training courses; that
will be considered and discussed by news-
paper and magazine editors, columnists, and
commentators; and that are distributed abroad
to promote better understanding of the Ameri-
can economic system.
CED believes that by enabling business
leaders to demonstrate constructively their
concern for the general welfare, it is helping
business to earn and maintain the national
and community respect essential to the
successful functioning of the free enterprise
capitalist system.
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